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In the early morning hours of May 16th, 1846 Parliament gathered for the final reading to 
repeal the Corn Laws. While the Corn Laws had been a highly contested topic within Britain for 
over two decades, it was at this juncture that the Conservative party of Sir Robert Peel fractured. 
As this study shall demonstrate, the Corn Law crisis of 1846 did not destroy Peel’s version of 
Conservativism as has often been argued, but rather put it into a state of suspended animation. 
The division of the party only twelve years after its formation has long been a topic of interest to 
historians. As previous histories have suggested, Peel had attempted to revive the old idea of 
Toryism but also to transform it into his new Conservative idea. This thesis goes beyond this to 
suggest that Peel’s own unique form of Conservatism not only shaped the party in 1834 but also 
helped it to recover after the split of 1846. As the blueprint for Conservative political discourse, 
the ideas set forth in Peel’s Tamworth Manifesto (1834) outlined the fundamental structures and 
tenets for a national Conservative party. His central argument was that Conservatives should 
work to actively reform state institutions as a way of preserving them. This was a revolutionary 
idea and the central pillar of Tamworth Conservatism.  Illustrating his own form of 
Conservativism the manifesto identified what this new political ideology was to entail for his 
first ministry (1835) and beyond. Peel’s visions for the party after 1835 started a new type of 
political discourse in British politics. This new discourse was centered on the ideals of 
preservation of state institutions via careful reforms. To establish a new political organization his 
Tamworth Conservativism had to become the party’s standard. Peel’s Manifesto, guided the 
growth and formation of a party ideology from 1834 to 1846. Peel’s decision to repeal the Corn 
x 
  
Laws in 1846 was met with fierce Conservative opposition, leading to an internal party rebellion. 
Conservative division in 1846 was fueled by discontent with Conservative leadership and the 
perceived opaqueness of Peel’s Conservative principles. However, the Conservative split of 1846 
did not result in the abandonment of Conservatism but a period of Conservative dormancy. The 
Conservative party, unlike Peel’s political career, survived and was rebuilt to become a serious 
contender in British politics. More than a bit ironically, the restoration of Conservativism in 1852 
was based upon a return to its origins in Peel’s manifesto; a Conservativism that was built upon 
the ideas of careful, active, and thought-out reforms designed to preserve and protect state 
institutions. This suggests that the legacy of Peel’s Tamworth Conservatism and the Corn Laws 






















THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN THE HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE  
In the early morning hours of May 16th 1846 Parliament gathered for the final reading of 
the Act that would repeal the Corn Laws and in so doing would bring the demise of Peel’s 
ministry and fracture the party he had created. However, as this thesis shall demonstrate, the 
Conservative split of 1846 did not result in the collapse of Conservative party but rather a period 
of Conservative dormancy. True, the fight to repeal the Corn Laws destroyed Peel’s political 
career and nearly destroyed his Conservativism, but the crisis of 1846 did not damage Peel’s 
Conservative party beyond repair. After a long season of dormancy Peel’s Conservativism 
reemerged with a seemingly new direction but with a familiar strategy.  This thesis shall argue 
that the formation of Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism, as the foundational ideology for the 
Conservative party, and the Conservative split over the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 remain 
more closely intertwined than previously stated in the historiography.  This connection between 
the formation of Peel’s Conservativism and the party schism caused by the Corn Laws suggests 
that Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism did not end when Peel stepped down in 1846. 
The Corn Laws were part of a long tradition of government regulations over imports and 
exports of grains that predated the nineteenth century. The Importation Acts of 1815 (Geo. 3 
c.26), most infamously known as the Corn Laws, were a set of tariff laws that dated back to the 
seventeenth century.
1
  The 1815 modification had created a paradigm shift in the tariff by 
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establishing a total exclusion of Corn until the domestic price of Corn reached 80 Shillings per 
quarter (480lbs).
2
  These laws, even in their own time, were largely unpopular in a country that 
was already moving towards a system of free trade. The Corn Laws’ design was to protect 
British grain from being undercut by cheaper foreign alternatives. At base, the Corn Laws 
suffered the flaw of being too rigid of a system that generated little to no revenue for the state 
while pushing up the price of flour and bread for consumers. Demands to change the Corn Laws 
arose in the late 1820s and resulted in the adoption of a new sliding scale that was designed to 
lower the import duty on foreign grain as the price of domestic grain rose. The problem of the 
Corn Laws was their indisputable linkage to the interests of the landed aristocracy. The tie 
between economic protectionism and the aristocracy became more overt as time progressed. 
Aristocratic members of Parliament were well aware of the shrinking of their own power, 
particularly after the passage of the Reform Bill in 1832 which had removed their monopoly over 
the electorate. Maintenance of the Corn Laws came to be seen as the landed interests’ last great 
attempt to retain control over the economy for their own benefit. Thus, popular disgust with the 
Corn Laws also became disgust with the economic and political position of the aristocracy.   
The growing discontent with the aristocracy’s maintenance of the Corn Laws created one 
of the most powerful political interest groups to emerge in Britain. The formation of the Anti-
Corn Law League (ACLL) created a public movement against the Corn Laws and the aristocratic 
landlords that supported them.
3
 The League’s purpose was to pressure the government to repeal 
the Corn Laws in their entirety. The propaganda from the League created an atmosphere of 
national political unrest that was increased by the humanitarian crisis associated with the potato 
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famine in Ireland.  Historians have recognized the connection between the famine and the repeal 
of the Corn Laws as significant, noting that while the ACLL pressured the government to repeal 
the Laws for many years it was the crisis in Ireland which finally forced the change. Peel’s 
decision in late autumn of 1845 to repeal the Corn Laws was because of growing food shortages 
in Ireland, and growing political unrest in England.  The Corn Law crisis split the Conservative 
party over the continuation of the Corn Laws and the doctrine of protectionism.  The division of 
the Conservative party in 1846 typically appears to be a division between traditionalists and 
reformers.  However, this division, when investigated closely, appears to be a division over 
Conservativism itself, more specifically the Conservativism of the party’s founder Sir Robert 
Peel.  
The Conservative party prior to the Corn Law crisis had struggled with the ideas of 
reform and how to maintain institutions of the state (the church, the aristocracy, the economy, 
and the Monarchy) in this new industrial age.  The Conservatives and, to a greater extent, the 
Tories,
4
 were often criticized for their support of an unpopular series of laws.  The histories of 
both the ACLL and the repeal of the Corn Laws have shown little sympathy to the Protectionist 
Conservatives who dominated the party after repeal. Portrayed often as economic dunces and 
aloof landed aristocrats, the Protectionists have been cast aside as the losers in a battle for 
Britain’s economic future.  However, they would play an important role in salvaging the 
Conservative party of Robert Peel and transforming it into a powerful political force in British 
politics.  Ironically, their revival of the Conservative party would require a return to the message 
that Peel had used to reorganize the Tories into the Conservative party in the first place.  
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Peel, Conservativism, and the Corn Laws A Historiographical Study  
The split in Peel’s Conservative party during the Corn Law crisis has created a problem 
for historians analyzing Peel’s own Conservativism. The division of the Conservative party only 
twelve years after its formation is a major point of interest. Why had Peel’s seemingly pragmatic 
and necessary actions in 1846 so bitterly divided the party and why had that division become so 
heated? This question has been the subject of numerous works analyzing the Conservative party 
and the Conservative political and economic discourses between 1830 and 1852. Of particular 
interest to historians have been the politics of Sir Robert Peel. Those who have investigated this 
puzzle have searched for an explanation as to why Peel decided to repeal the Corn Laws and why 
his party became so bitterly divided that it prevented the Conservative party from holding a 
majority government for a generation.  Previous historical studies have investigated this problem 
and have focused upon the politics of Sir Robert Peel. These works argue that the making of 
Peel’s Conservative party and the Corn Law crisis of 1846 were the dual climax points of his 
political career.  As these historians have suggested, the politics of Peel and his Conservative 
party were dramatically altered in the wake of the fundamental reshaping of the British political 
system occasioned by the passage of the Great Reform Bill of 1832. Politicians had to create a 
wholly new approach towards the electorate.  
Philip Salmon’s work Electoral Reform at Work: Local Politics and National Parties 
1832-1841 suggested that the period before the second Peel Ministry (1841) saw the emergence 
of a new type of party politics. Salmon argued that Peel’s revival of the Tory party, through his 
Tamworth Manifesto, rallied the party to reorganize itself into a new type of political 
5 
  
organization designed to work in the post-Reform Bill era.
5
 Peel’s Manifesto set a foundation for 
a new form of partisan politics and helped to create more rigid political parties built around 
clearly delineated ideological frameworks.  The most crucial part of Salmon’s thesis was that this 
system of new political parties and the systems in which they operated were part of an ongoing 
and active process.  Peel’s Conservative party in this early period (1834-5) was undergoing a 
continuous process of adaptations and modifications to the new political environment. While 
Peel had successfully imagined a new political party for the post-Reform Bill era, he had to 
actively work to mold the old Tories into new Conservatives.  Salmon argues that when Peel 
accepted the changes of 1832 he initiated a new age of British politics. Peel’s new political 
organization illustrated that the new type of politics being developed was largely influenced by 
the changes initiated by the Reform Bill.   
Norman Gash, the foremost biographer of Sir Robert Peel, has analyzed the life and 
legacy of both Peel and his administrations. His most notable works were his two-volume 
biography of Robert Peel, respectively titled Mr. Secretary Peel (1961), and Sir Robert Peel 
(1972) and his successful political study Politics in the Age of Peel (1953). Although his 
interpretations of Peel’s politics have been challenged in recent analyses’, his biographies remain 
the most definitive and complete historical works in the field.  In each of these 
works, Gash investigated the reshaping of parliamentary politics in what he terms the ‘Age of 
Peel’.  
In Politics in the Age of Peel Gash argued that after the passage of the Great Reform Bill 
(1832) both the Whigs and the Tories had to redesign themselves to fit into a new system 
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 Leading this new age of political change was Robert Peel. Gash claimed 
that Peel’s political views were pragmatic and took a centrist approach to reform Toryism in the 
post-Reform Bill era. Gash’s detailed analysis of electoral workings post-1832 suggests that the 
Reform Bill initiated some political changes but did not constitute an extreme change, and can be 
best explained by understanding those who drafted it. The men that drafted the Reform Bill were 
not, as Gash argued, battling over abstract principles, but rather working to prevent a disaster. 
Gash stated that, “Both parties believed in property not numbers: both were anxious to avert 
bloodshed and disorder.”
7
He argued that Peel’s Tamworth Manifesto was the key document in 
the formation of post-Reform Bill politics.  With its emphasis on the necessity and acceptance of 
reform and gradual change, Gash argued, Peel was attempting to create a party and an ideology 
to occupy the political center and appeal to the new electorate.
8
  
Gash’s interpretation of Peel’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws has been one of the most 
hotly contested pieces of Gash’s analysis of Peel’s political legacy.  Gash’s central argument 
concerning Peel’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws was that Peel made the choice after a 
‘conversion’ to free trade in 1845.
9
 This, Gash argued, was part of Peel’s pragmatic politics and 
his belief that his party must accept gradual change if it hoped to continue as a governing party. 
Gash argued that Peel’s failure to contain Protectionist elements within his party ultimately 
fueled the split of 1846.  Gash's argument for Peel’s pragmatic reasons to repeal the Corn Laws 
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was part of his general thesis that the politics of Peel were successful, and they were the way of 
the future. 
Gash’s highly detailed analysis of Peel’s politics and legacy has remained a dominant 
force in the historiography. His argument was that the ‘Age of Peel’ was one of both moderation 
and pragmatism.  These interpretations of Peel as a political pragmatist have been severely 
criticized by other historians, particularly those that have also investigated the entire political 
career of Peel and arrived at very different conclusions.    
Boyd Hilton’s article, ‘Peel: A Reappraisal,’ suggested that rather than being the 
originator of a Conservative idea, as Gash had indicated, Peel was actually the originator of a 
certain brand of Liberalism. Hilton argues that Peel was not a pragmatic centrist but rather a rigid 
doctrinaire leader bound by his own ideology.
10
   He claimed that Peel’s efforts during the 
‘liberal’ Tory era to pursue reforms, both civil and economic, suggest that his later ‘conversion’ 
to free trade was never a conversion at all.
11
  In Hilton’s interpretation, Peel’s Tamworth 
Manifesto continued these trends of ‘liberal’ thinking and Peel’s continued ‘liberal’ Tory outlook 
extended well into his second ministry.  Hilton’s revision to the historiography of Robert Peel 
has not been without challenges.  Recent works have suggested that Gash’s view of Peel as a 
pragmatic centrist have not been completely overturned by Hilton’s portrayal of Peel as a rigid 
doctrinaire.
12
 Rather it seems that Peel’s earliest influences had made him a bit of both.  Recent 
works have turned to an evaluation of both camps when examining Peel from Tamworth up to 
the time of the Corn Law crisis. An investigation into Peel’s early political career indicates that 
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he may not have been the flexible centrist as portrayed by many in the historiography, but rather 
was an idealist whose exposure to the ‘liberal’ Tory ideas of his youth shaped his own particular 
form of conservativism. 
Paul Adelman’s work Peel and the Conservative Party defines this new era of politics 
using Gash’s term the ‘Age of Peel’ (1834-1846). Marking them as a crucial start to the new era 
of mass political change, Adelman argues that Peel’s ideas redefined British politics. Peel’s 
acceptance of the new type and system of politics that emerged after the Great Reform Bill of 
1832 started with his creation of a new political party, the Conservatives.  Peel’s ideas for 
Conservative party politics were organized and presented to the nation through his Tamworth 
Manifesto of 1834.  This act of national publication was portrayed by Adelman as a deliberate 
appeal to the newly enfranchised middle classes. In effect this was the first salvo in the battle for 
national party and voter mobilization.
13
 As Peel reiterated many times “we [the Conservative 
party] are not separated by any line of interest or any other line of demarcation from the middle 
classes”.
14
 Adelman uses this language from Peel to show that a new form of electoral political 
mobilization had begun. 
Politics during the Age of Peel, as Adelman suggests, climaxed with Peel’s decision to 
repeal the Corn Laws. Peel’s repeal of the Corn Laws (1846), Adelman argued, was the result of 
political rather than economic reasoning.
15
 He noted that Peel’s decision, although unpopular 
with many Conservatives, was actually made in order to preserve the traditional powers of the 
aristocracy.  Citing Peel’s earlier modifications to the Corn Laws (1842-3), Adelman stated that 
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Peel had been attempting a careful balancing act between his party and those opposed to the 
Corn Laws for quite some time. Peel’s modifications were careful reforms that were again, more 
political than economic in design.  He had hoped to yield a little ground to moderate opponents 
of the Corn Laws without sacrificing so much as to upset the Protectionists within his 
party.
16
These ideas of careful reform had been the backbone of his Conservativism, which 
Adelman argued was somewhat pragmatic.  Debates between Peel and his Conservative back 
benchers over the Corn Laws illustrated a schism in Conservativism that had existed ever since 
the organization of the Conservative party in 1834.  Despite the profound division that had 
emerged after 1846, the ideas of Peel lived on in the Peelite party. Adelman concluded his 
argument in a similar fashion to Gash, suggesting that the “Age of Peel’ had been one of 
moderation and pragmatism. 
Robert Stewart’s works The Politics of Protection: Lord Derby and the Protectionist 
Party 1841-1852 and The Foundation of the Conservative Party 1830-1867 tackle the central 
issue of Conservative division during the fight to repeal the Corn Laws.  He argues that the 
Conservative party started by Peel in 1834 had a series of internal divisions that would 
eventually shatter the party in 1846.  These divisions among ‘conservative’ thinkers highlighted 
the fact that the party started by Peel had not yet established a firm political identity or ideology 
beyond its initial opposition to Whig radicalism. His work The Foundation of the Conservative 
Party argues that the Conservative division, occasioned by the Corn Law crisis, forced the 
remaining conservatives to create a new direction for themselves following Peel’s ‘betrayal’ in 
1846.  He argues that while the Protectionists and Peelites were remarkably similar in their 
origins, they approached the idea of free trade very differently. Stewart argues that although 
external pressure from the public and the ACLL was important, it was internal changes in the 
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Conservative party that drove it to split in 1846.  He argued that the Protectionists did not see the 
Corn Laws so much as a long-term economic plan but as a link between the landed interest and 
the unwritten British constitution.
17
  
The Protectionists have often been portrayed in the history of Corn Law politics as 
economic illiterates who rejected the new ideas of free trade in favor of the old system of 
mercantilism.  Stewart argues the Protectionists were all too cautious concerning the idea of free 
trade and looked to the past for what suited the country best.  They did not claim that corn would 
be cheaper in Britain than other places. As many of the skeptics of free trade argued, they were 
not willing to let Manchester prosper at the expense of Coventry.
18
 Stewart’s argument 
concerning the Protectionists suggests that histories built around a League based telling of events 
have cemented Conservative Protectionists into the role of villains. While many Protectionists 
did question the economic value of repeal of the Corn Laws the majority were far more 
concerned with the position of the aristocracy in the state.  For them, repeal was more about 
politics than economics.  
Anna Gambles’ article “Rethinking the Politics of Protection: Conservatism and the Corn 
Laws, 1830-1852” and her book Protection and Politics: Conservative Economic Discourse, 
1815-1852 investigate the Conservative approach to economic issues during the Age of Peel and 
the Conservative split. She argues that during the Corn Law crisis the Conservatives had 
legitimate concerns about the rapid conversion to free trade.  Conservative support for reforms to 
the financial system such as the Bank Charter Act of 1833 and 1844, illustrated the party’s 
willingness to adapt and modernize. These acts developed a more ‘liberal’ financial system with 
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the printing and expansion of Bank of England paper currency. Gambles argued that the ‘liberal’ 
financial reforms were undertaken by the Conservative Peel ministry to not only stabilize the 
currency but also to reinforce the role of state.
19
 She also drew the link to the ‘liberal’ Tory 
ideology of the 1820s when it came to reforming aspects of financial institutions.  To that effect 
she argued that Peel’s Conservative government was willing to support banking reforms, not 
only because it reinforced protectionism, but also because the Conservatives genuinely believed 
the reforms would make the banking system work better.   
Gambles suggested that previous histories, as well as League propaganda, were wrong to 
label the Protectionists as economic ignoramuses.
20
  Her argument stems from a critique of the 
histories written by the Anti-Corn Law League that often questioned the intellectual ability of the 
Protectionists to grasp contemporary economics.
21
  She instead argued that the debate between 
the two Conservative factions was an argument about the role of the state and the aristocracy 
well beyond the simple application of the Corn Laws. The Protectionists argued that the state 
(especially the landed classes) had a legitimate position in the economy through rights 
guaranteed in the constitution.
22
  Additionally, Gambles argues that the defenders of the Corn 
Laws were well aware that total repeal would not drastically lower the price of bread as the 
League’s propaganda suggested.
23
  They were also well aware of the importance of 
manufacturing to the British economy and had embraced it. She states these facts to support her 
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argument that the Corn Law debate was about more than simple economics. Yet, as Stewart 
suggested, the Protectionists were not willing to destroy certain elements of the British economy 
(namely agriculture) just to allow another to flourish.  Gambles’ argument as to why the 
Protectionists supported the Corn Laws suggests that it was for political rather than economic 
reasons. An effort, the Protectionists were against repeal primarily because they thought repeal 
was not a reform but rather a fundamental change to a vital state institution.  Therefore, Peel’s 




Bruce Coleman’s work Conservatism: and the Conservative Party in the Nineteenth 
Century discusses the origins of Conservativism after 1832 and the challenges that arose from 
the Corn Law crisis. Although Coleman’s work was concerned with the long run of the 
Conservative party in the 19
th
 century, his emphasis on its formative years stress the importance 
behind the reorganization of Tory forces after the Reform Bill. Coleman states that Peel’s vision 
for a union of ‘conservatives’ was equal parts revival and reinvention. He argues that when Peel 
used the term ‘Conservative,’ he was making a clear declaration to conserve the Constitution and 
the institutions of the state that were attached to it.
25
  
Coleman’s analysis of the Conservative party under the leadership of Robert Peel argued 
that Peel had been working on creating a political party that would act on behalf of the nation 
rather than just select members of society.
26
 This notion of Conservativism would be later 
expanded under future Conservative Prime Ministers after the resignation of Peel. Coleman, like 
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other historians of the Conservative party, claims that Disraeli more than Peel created the 
modern Conservative party.  However, Coleman was not willing to diminish the legacy of Robert 
Peel, arguing that Peel’s initiative in adapting to the Reform Bill helped to save and modernize 
Toryism and start to transform it into Conservativism.
27
 Coleman, much like Gash, sees the 
Conservative party’s adaptability, inclusiveness, and attempted modernization, after 1834, as the 
essential foundation on which the Conservative idea would develop.  
Travis Crosby’s Sir Robert Peel’s Administration 1841-1846 takes an investigative 
approach to the successes and failures of Peel’s Conservative party during his second 
administration.  Dealing with an increasingly sophisticated electorate Peel’s party dealt with 
issues of both political and economic reform that at times tested his Conservative idea.
28
  Crosby 
notes that Peel’s government pursued modifications to the Corn Laws, the financial system and 
the Church with relatively little Tory obstruction.  While each of these reforms was undertaken 
in a progressive way many within Peel’s government were by no means active social 
reformers.
29
  Crosby, like Gash, argues that Peel and his Conservative party were pragmatic 
centrists that used reform to weigh the balance of issues against one another. The division caused 
by the decision to repeal the Corn Laws, Crosby argues, was an act that Peel saw as a necessity 
to maintain order and social stability between the industrial middle classes and the landed elite.
30
  
Although Peel left the office of Prime Minister with a divided party, his legacy would 
outlive his defeat.  Peel’s refusal to accept any form of leadership of the Peelites signaled his 
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refusal to accept a total and final division of the Conservative Party he had created.
31
 Crosby 
argues that Peel’s political failure was due to the fact the he had underestimated the strength of 
the Protectionist cause within his party and that this failure to recognize such a strong dissonance 
cost him greatly. Peel and the Peelites became supportive of the Whig party and Whig notions of 
free trade but refused an all-out merger with the Whig party. The legacy of the second Peel 
ministry, with its attention to careful reforms, both political and economic, would serve as a 
model for future governments’ reforms and economic responsibilities.
32
 
The most recent analysis of Peel’s forty-year career was Richard A. Gaunt’s 2010 work, 
Sir Robert Peel: The Life and Legacy. Gaunt draws from a huge collection of Peel’s writings to 
help unwrap the troubling historgraphical legacy of the man. The question that has troubled 
historians since Gash’s mid-20
th
 century analysis is this: was Peel a pragmatic centrist and 
Conservative modernizer of the Tory party or a rigid doctrinaire of a certain brand of 
liberalism?
33
 Gaunt’s argument suggests that the persistent suspicions that surround Peel’s 
politics have evolved with the analysis of Peel’s forty-year political career. His start as a Tory 
defender of the established Church and opponent of Catholic emancipation (so much so he 
earned the nickname “Orange Peel”) critiques Gash’s argument that Peel was a pragmatic 
centrist. In relation to his change of heart over Catholic emancipation, Gaunt, like Hilton, argues 
that Peel’s vision of Conservativism was focused on embracing timely, practical, and necessary 
reforms without compromising on larger principles.
34
 However, unlike Hilton, Gaunt argued that 
Peel’s politics in the 1820s did not lead to his ‘conversion’ to free trade ideas, but it was rather a 
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period in which he formed his political ideology. Gaunt’s work illustrates the ongoing 
historiographical problem with Peel, the Conservative party and the repeal of the Corn Laws; the 
problem that has plagued the histories of this subject since Gash’s 1953 interpretation.  This 
study suggests that it is essential to conduct both a reevaluation of Peel’s politics and an 
investigation into his conservative consistencies in the pursuit of reform.  It will challenge the 
previously observed interpretations that Peel’s politics were neither that of a political pragmatist 
nor that of a rigid doctrinaire.  
As most of the historians discussed above have suggested, Peel’s Conservativism was a 
flexible pragmatic ideology with the goal of bringing the old Tory party to the political center. 
Arguing that Peel was an outstanding politician and statesman, driven by practical necessity over 
the course of his political life, has forced the historiography to focus on Peel’s political changes 
rather than his consistencies.  However, as Hilton argued in his re-evaluation of Peel, his political 
experiences in the 1820s were extremely influential on his later decisions and in his construction 
of the Conservative party. Hilton argued that Peel’s politics constituted a firm continuation of 
‘liberal’ Toryism and that Peel’s consistencies were clear evidence of that ‘liberal’ Tory 
ideology.  However, as this thesis shall demonstrate, Peel’s politics were driven by his own 
unique ideological development, and were not entirely limited to the old ‘liberal’ Tory idea.  
Tamworth Conservativism, as imagined by Peel in 1834, was a product of his own time, political 
upbringing and of his own unique and evolving perspective on what constituted the ‘national 
interest.” These were the factors that would influence his political decisions for the remainder of 
his life. His creation of the Conservative party and his Conservativism were to follow these 
lifelong principles.  As many of these authors have suggested, Peel’s creation of a Conservative 
idea was not an immediate or easy action.  The division of the party in 1846 was fueled by 
16 
  
internal discontent with Peel’s leadership and the perceived variability of Peel’s principles. 
Unlike what these historians have argued this thesis shall show that Peel’s Conservativism 
outlived both Peel and the Corn Law crisis of 1846.  Ironically, the group of Conservatives that 
emerged from the Corn Law crisis made it their objective to reinvent the party based on the 
foundational principles of Robert Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism.   
 
Sir Robert Peel in Historical Perspective 
The historiographical debate over the formation of Peel’s Conservative party illustrates 
that from 1834 or 1846 Peel and his Conservatives were making their own party for their own 
age.  Peel’s visions for the party after 1835 launched a new type of political discourse in British 
politics. This new discourse centered on the preservation of state institutions (the church, crown, 
and economy) via careful reforms. Additionally, it remains evident that the making of Peel’s 
Conservative party and Conservativism must be understood in the context of the repeal of the 
Corn Laws.  This important event fundamentally separated Peel’s Conservative party from the 
old Tory party and created a new political discourse.  As this work will argue, this new political 
discourse can only be fully understood by examining the ideas of Robert Peel with particular 
reference to his ‘Tamworth’ Conservativism.
35
 
Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism was different from ‘Conservative’ ideas of the past.  
That is to say Peel’s Conservative approach was a product of both his time and of his personal 
character.  In his numerous biographies (both recent and older works which remain 
historiographicly significant) Peel and his Conservative idea are typically traced to his family 
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origins. Peel was born in 1788 to the textile industrialist and parliamentarian Robert Peel (1
st
 
Baronet). Peel, as his biographer Norman Gash memorably writes, was born “to the world of 
Gibbon and Joshua Reynolds, of stage-coaches, highwaymen and the judicial burning of women, 
[but]died in 1850 in the age of Faraday and Darwin, of Punch, railway excursions, trade unions 
and income tax.”
36
 Peel’s politics were a direct product of this transformative era. His Tamworth 
Conservativism would be designed to take the world of his youth and transition it, and the 
institutions that accompanied it, into the modern age. Peel followed his father into politics in 
1809 as an MP for the rotten Irish borough of Cashel. Sponsored by his father and the Duke of 
Wellington, the man who would become arguably the greatest reformer of the nineteenth century 
ironically began his political career through the operation of a corrupted electoral system.
37
  
A youthful face in parliament, Peel, like his father, joined the Tory party as a follower of 
the ideas of William Pitt the younger.
38
 Pitt had identified often as an independent Whig, and it is 
of some significance that the branch of the Tory party to which both the younger and elder Peel 
gave their allegiance, evolved from this particular branch of Whiggism. As Richard Gaunt 
argues, Peel’s apprenticeship in the Tory party was in many ways an unfortunate circumstance. 
His assumption that Peel would have excelled in the Whig party suggests a strong element of 
‘liberalism’ within the young Tory. Historians have long argued and debated whether or not Peel 
was a ‘liberal’ wolf in Tory sheep’s clothing.
39
 However, it is difficult to accept that before 1832 
Peel can be seen as a great reformer. Some historians have maintained that Peel’s sponsors, both 
his father and the Duke of Wellington, had guided him into the Tory party and he had to repay 
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the favor with loyalty.  This argument is heavily debated.  Peel’s patrons may have expected a 
return on their investment, however, Peel’s change of heart, in 1829, with his support of Catholic 
emancipation contradicts this suspicion.  His ‘betrayal’ over Catholic emancipation illustrated 
Peel’s loyalty was not to his patrons but rather to his conscience.  The long debated origins of 
Peel’s own form of Conservativism began at this point when he made the decision that to press 




Peel’s first speech in parliament (an 1810 reply to the King’s speech) met with great 
applause and caught the attention of leading Tory members as it was noted as “the best first 
speech since that of William Pitt”.
41
 Peel’s early entrance into high politics was regarded as 
successful and he was labeled as a person of interest.  Noting his strong speaking ability MP’s 
recognized why Wellington had chosen to support the young Robert Peel.  Although his 
contemporaries did not see the younger Peel as a traditional Tory, he was welcomed into the 
party as the face of the next generation of Tories.  Peel’s entrance into politics through the Tory 
party has been a point of debate amongst historians.  Some have argued that both Peel and his 
father were following the ideas of Pitt rather than mainstream Toryism. This has led to the theory 
that both Peels had a certain ‘liberal’ leaning despite their outward allegiance to the Tory party. 
The true nature of Peel’s early political beliefs may never really be understood but the type of 
politics that he would develop in his youth would shape his designs for a new political 
organization.  









The historiography concerning the origins of Peel’s Conservativism often highlights the 
era of Lord Liverpool’s ‘liberal’ Tory administration (1822-1827) as a precursor to the 
Conservative party. Referred to as the ‘liberal’ Tory era the Liverpool administration presided 
over a period of reform and progress, shaping Peel’s early perceptions that Toryism, especially 
‘liberal’ Toryism, was the true legacy of Pitt and Burke.
42
  Historians have argued that this era, 
and the figures that would emerge from it, became rising stars in British politics and the leading 
political thinkers of the early Victorian era.  Peel’s involvement in Liverpool’s government 
earned him the position of Home Secretary in 1822. As Home Secretary, Peel clearly saw the 
necessity of certain types of reform. Working on liberalizing criminal law and organizing an 
early police force, Peel arguably was, as Gaunt suggests, an active ‘liberal’ Tory.
43
  Many of 
these ideas in the more recent works suggest that Peel was not so much the pragmatic centrist 
that Gash had originally cast him. Hilton’s interpretation of Peel’s politics argued that Peel was 
more connected to a certain set of ideas than a pragmatic reaction to the changes of the 
nineteenth century. Following Hilton’s argument, it appears that Peel maintained a certain series 
of principles throughout his life that were extremely important to the formation of the 
Conservative party and his Conservativism.  
 
*** 
 Historians of Peel have almost universally acknowledged the origins of the Conservative 
party in Peel’s 1834 Tamworth Manifesto.  While his manifesto remained central to his politics 
the ideas that sparked Peel’s own Conservatism can be traced back to the era of ‘liberal’ Toryism 
(1822-1827).  The two major schools of historiographical thought concerning Peel’s complex, 
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reserved personality contests whether Peel was a pragmatist or a rigid doctrinaire. These schools 
have investigated Peel’s entire political career from his first speech in Parliament to his last and 
have come to very different conclusions about his political ideology. As this study will 
demonstrate, Peel’s early political career within the ‘liberal’ wing of the Tory party was essential 
in forming his early political beliefs.  His early politics and challenges, especially his decision on 
Catholic emancipation, would play a fundamental role in shaping his Conservativism.  Unlike 
the works of previous historians this investigation shall argue that Peel’s politics and attitudes 
could be traced to the ‘liberal’ Tory era and evolved with Peel to become his Tamworth 
Conservativism.  This Conservativism, derived from Peel’s own politics, would come to reshape 
the Tory party and create a new direction for politics for the remainder of the century. The 
Conservative party, grounded in the ideas of Peel’s Conservativism, would outlast a number of 
crises during Peel’s leadership.  When the party was divided in 1846 its new leaders would 



















REFORMED TOYRISM AND THE EARLY FORMATION OF CONSERVATIVISM  
Since the turn of the 19
th
 century Toryism had been defined by its defense of the 
establishment, most specifically the crown, the church, and the aristocracy. During the 1820s, 
under the leadership of Lord Liverpool, Toryism evolved into what historians have labeled as 
‘liberal’ Toryism.  In political terms the ‘liberal’ Tory era was defined by a series of reforms to 
state institutions and by the success of Toryism electorally.  However, the success of ‘liberal’ 
Toryism was short lived. After the death of Lord Liverpool in 1827 the succeeding Tory 
governments failed to continue the policies that made Liverpool’s government successful. The 
electoral collapse of the Tories after the passage of the Great Reform Bill of 1832 had opened 
parliament to a new era of Whig government. Facing political crisis, the Tory remnants had to 
reevaluate their own politics, most notably how to approach the idea of reform after the passage 
of the Reform Bill. Therefore, to enter into the post-Reform Bill era the Tories had to reinvent 
themselves and Toryism in order to survive as a political organization. A new generation would 
emerge after the death of Lord Liverpool to take the leadership of his ‘liberal’ Tory legacy and 
the larger legacy of Pitt and Burke.   
Robert Peel orchestrated the reorganization of Toryism after the passage of the Reform 
Bill thereby creating the political organization that would succeed Toryism.  This idea would be 
called Conservativism. However, reorganizing Toryism and transforming it along Peel’s own 
principles into Conservativism was a difficult task for Peel to manage. To initiate these changes 
22 
  
Peel would have to convince his party that the reforms they had opposed in the recent past 
(Catholic emancipation, the Great Reform Bill) had to be accepted.  Peel would call upon his 
experience in the Liverpool government and the reforms he had spearheaded as examples of the 
types of reforms the new Conservative party should undertake. It was Robert Peel’s own political 
ideology, based in ‘liberal’ Toryism that would be used to transition Toryism into a political 
ideology for post-Reform Bill Britain.    
 
Toryism into Conservatism and the Tamworth Manifesto 
The formation of modern conservativism actually predated the origins of Robert Peel’s 
party in 1834. As the historiography suggests, the origins of Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism 
stretched back to the so-called ‘liberal’ Tory period. The government of Lord Liverpool (1822-
1827) dominated this era of Tory success. The Tory governments before the Reform Bill, 
especially Liverpool’s, had seen much success in both electoral and popular terms.  However, the 
‘liberal’ Toryism that had developed during Liverpool’s administration was itself an attempt to 
bring the party back to its roots in the ideas of the much-respected William Pitt the Younger, the 
Whig turned Tory.  
Liverpool’s ‘liberal’ Toryism had been marked by a belief in strong government 
dedicated to economic prosperity through reform.
44
 Liverpool’s government had taken a 
proactive approach to reform and had advocated for political and economic reforms as a way to 
combat the growing calls from the working and middle classes. As Liverpool worked to return 
the party to the ideas of Pitt, two factions emerged within the administration: the ‘liberal’ Tories 
and reactionary Tories (or Ultras).  The Ultra Tories were an extreme right wing faction of the 
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Tory party, and staunch defenders of the Anglican Church.  The Ultra faction came into 
existence in the 1820s as Tory opponents to the ‘liberal’ polices of the Liverpool government. 
Their role in the decline of Toryism climaxed in 1829 with the passage of Catholic emancipation.  
The Ultra-Tories rejected the label of extreme or reactionary and saw themselves as the true 
upholders of the Whig tradition of 1689.
45
 Conversely, the ‘liberal’ Tories thought of themselves 
in the same fashion except with closer ties to Pitt the Younger who had supported Catholic 
emancipation at the turn of the 19
th
 century. These two factions were often at odds with each 
other despite being part of the same government. Henry John Temple (Lord Palmerston) 
described the tension between the two groups of Tories as problematic for the continuation of 
Toryism.  As he saw it, in 1826, the Ultras were reactionary forces that were determined to 
prevent the party from returning to its roots:  
in truth the real opposition of the present day sit behind the Treasury Bench; and 
it is by the stupid old Tory party, who bawl out the memory and praises of Pitt 





John Henry Temple’s critique of the Ultras illustrated that while the party believed itself to be 
the successors of the politics of Pitt the Ultras were undermining his legacy.   
The passage of ‘liberal’ Pitt-like reforms sponsored by the Liverpool administration was 
an effort to remove a negative stigma from Toryism; a stigma that was associated with the 
repression of the lower orders by the aristocracy.  Reforms to criminal law with the Gaols Act of 
1823, introduced by Home Secretary Robert Peel, reformed the prison system by introducing 
payment of jailers and the prohibition of irons. Additionally, Peel’s reforms to criminal law 
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extended to the reduction of the number of capital offences and a significant reduction in 
executions.
47
  Furthermore, key economic reforms were undertaken by the Liverpool 
government.  The relaxation of the Navigation Acts in 1823 reduced colonial trade restrictions 
and a gradual reduction of duties in 1825 helped to stimulate economic growth and 
employment.
48
   Reforms undertaken by the Liverpool government and Robert Peel have been 
argued to be liberal in their nature, however they were actually more ‘conservative’, that is to 
say, they worked within the existing system to make it work more efficiently rather than to 
change it fundamentally. Peel’s reforms to the criminal justice system and Liverpool’s relaxation 
of the Navigation Acts were indeed reforms that had lasting consequences but did not tackle the 
larger constitutional issues.  
Despite the successes of the ‘liberal’ Tory government, Liverpool’s administration was 
often at war with itself.  Ultra Toryism became highly problematic.  This section of the party was 
unwilling to compromise on reforms to the Church, Crown, the aristocracy, and the 
constitution.
49
  Regardless, ‘liberal’ sections of the party pressed for careful reforms.  In a letter 
to the young Robert Peel, Irish statesman John Wilson Croker argued that while the public 
clamored for reform it should be undertaken carefully.
50
While the ‘liberal’ Toryism of Lord 
Liverpool appears to be a precursor to Peel’s Conservative party, with its belief in careful 
reform, the reluctance on behalf of the party leadership to pursue larger parliamentary reforms 
prevented ‘liberal’ Toryism from evolving. Its failures to make any efforts at larger constitutional 
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changes such as Pitt had tried in 1801 further damaged the party.
51
 In essence, the ‘liberal’ Tory 
party prolonged the survival of Toryism until 1832 rather than letting it die at the hands of the 
Ultra reactionaries in the 1820s.   
The death of Lord Liverpool, in 1827, began a change in the politics of the ‘liberal’ 
Tories.  He was succeeded by the ‘liberal’ Tory, George Canning.  Canning’s administration was 
plagued by a more heated division between Ultras and ‘liberals’.  Canning’s government, unlike 
Liverpool’s, did not have the support of the Ultra Tories and was forced to draw in more support 
from the Whig party.  This further distanced Canning from political moderates like Robert Peel, 
who subsequently resigned from the office of Home Secretary. Canning’s tenure as Prime 
Minster ended after only 119 days with his death on August 8
th
 1827.  His replacement was the 
unlikeable Viscount Goderich (Lord Ripon).  Like Canning, Goderich’s term as PM was also 
destined to be quite short, lasting only 144 days, over the course of which he managed to earn the 
hatred of both the Ultras and the ‘liberal’ Tories.  Goderich was summed up by King George IV 
as “a damned, sniveling, blubbering blockhead.”
52
 While Goderich was the de jure leader of the 
party the real power was in the hands of the Duke of Wellington and Robert Peel, a rising star 
within the party. The two brief ministries of Canning and Goderich illustrated the crisis within 
‘liberal’ Toryism as to who would succeed Liverpool and take the mantle of the liberal Tories. 
Goderich’s resignation in 1828 was widely welcomed and he was succeeded by the Duke of 
Wellington.  
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Wellington’s government (1828-1830) undertook serious reforms to both the state and 
economy that the previous Liverpool government had avoided. Wellington had every opportunity 
to bring the Ultra Tories back into power, but the first person he chose for his cabinet was Robert 
Peel. With Peel in the all-important position of Home Secretary Wellington chose the remainder 
of his ministers carefully; seeking to balance the forces of the Ultras and the ‘liberal’ Tories. 
Significantly, the first reforms undertaken by Wellington were modifications to the Corn Laws. 
The economic reforms of the Liverpool government had avoided the Corn Laws specifically as 
Liverpool did not wish to revive the type of agitation that had occurred earlier, most notably at 
Peterloo in 1819.
53
 Reforms to the Corn Laws had to be undertaken as they caused the price of 
Corn to remain artificially high even as the nation sank deeper and deeper in the economic 
depression that had begun in 1815. The introduction of a ‘sliding scale’ was designed to lower 
the price of Corn and to continually adjust the tariff to the market price. With the introduction of 
the sliding scale in 1828 some foreign grain would be allowed into the British market. The need 
for modification was clear because the previous exclusionary price of 80s per quarter had 
artificially driven up the price of corn.  The introduction of a sliding scale allowed the duty free 
importation of grain when the domestic price reached 72s per quarter.  These changes were fully 
supported by many within the government and seen as a necessary reform.
54
 Modifications to the 
Corn Laws represented a ‘conservative’ approach to reform with evidence of a ‘liberal’ Tory 
economic mindset.  This modification in 1828 illustrated the developing mind-set of modern 
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Conservativism as it was undertaken to make an existing “institution” work more efficiently 
rather than to change it fundamentally. 
The next major reform the Wellington administration undertook was Peel’s notable 
Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 (10 Geo. 4, C.44).  This 1829 Act established the Metropolitan 
Police of London replacing the old system of constables. Similar to his reforms to criminal law 
in 1823 and 1825 his reforms to policing were the first piece of legislation ushering in a police 
force that would serve as a model for cities around the country.   Peel’s police force, often called 
‘bobbies’ or ‘peelers’, was designed to wear uniforms and interact with the public.  Peel had 
argued against the use of ununiformed police or spies and informants.  In the debate over 
criminal law Peel argued, “God forbid that I should mean to countenance a system of espionage; 
but a vigorous preventive police, consistent with the free principles, of our free  constitution, was 
an object which I did not despair of seeing accomplished.”
55
  When Peel set up the Metropolitan 
Police in 1829 he wanted the public to see the police as a visible presence of the state through 
which criminal law was being enforced for the good of the nation. 
However, the most pressing issue of Wellington’s government was the issue of Catholic 
emancipation. Although the idea of emancipation had been around since before the Act of Union 
with Ireland in 1800, the issue had been extremely divisive.  Pitt the Younger had fought for 
Catholic emancipation as part of the Act of Union in 1801.  However, upon hearing that the King 
(George III) would not support this, in part because it would violate his Coronation Oath, Pitt 
resigned and his government collapsed.
56
  Since the collapse of Pitt’s ministry in 1801 the Tories 
had refrained from pursuing any large parliamentary reforms on this issue.  Matters changed 
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after the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts in 1828 granted political rights to Non-
Conformists. Although initially opposed by Peel and the Tories, the support of Anglican Church 
leaders persuaded the government to pursue repeal.
57
 Following repeal of the Test and 
Corporation Acts the issue of Catholic rights became a major point of debate within the Tory 
party, with some fervently opposed to granting Catholics political rights.  In 1828 the Irishman 
Daniel O’Connell was elected to Parliament but could not take his seat in the House of 
Commons as a practicing Catholic. O’Connell then campaigned to gather public support for the 
emancipation of Catholics.  While supporters of emancipation were primarily in the Whig party, 
many Tories began to turn to support O’Connell’s campaign after a significant amount of public 
support became evident.  As Home Secretary, Robert Peel became instrumental in helping 
Wellington’s government pass Catholic emancipation. While initially opposed to Catholic 
emancipation (Peel had earned the nickname “Orange Peel” for his almost visceral opposition to 
expanding the political rights of Catholics), after O’Connell’s national campaign had gathered 
significant public support both Peel and the Duke of Wellington came to believe that if the nation 
was against the exclusion of Catholics they must adhere to the national will and pass the reform. 
Peel now viewed it as an absolutely necessary reform, for as he explained to Wellington, "though 
emancipation was a great danger, civil strife was a greater danger."
58
Peel had observed the 
growing tension in Ireland and believed that only by granting emancipation could a wholesale 
rebellion be prevented.  Peel’s close relationship with Wellington had also changed his positon 
concerning emancipation and the passage of the act was finalized in 1829. Although both men 
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originally opposed Catholic emancipation they became supporters of the reform because – in 
their collective view – it had become necessary for the health and security of the nation.  
The changing positon of both the Duke of Wellington and Robert Peel over Catholic 
emancipation signaled a return to Pittite ideas.  That is to say, reform when necessary. It was 
during these debates over Catholic emancipation that Peel’s own particular form of 
‘conservativism’ started to become independent of his ‘liberal’ Tory roots. Peel notes within his 
own memoirs that other than the repeal of the Corn Laws (1846) the fight to grant Catholic 
political rights was the most defining moment in his political life.
 59
  With the passage of 
Catholic emancipation, the balance of power in the House shifted towards the Whigs, which 
would have profound implications for Britain’s political future, most notably in the form of the 
Whig –sponsored legislation of 1832 and 1833.     
The Great Reform Bill of 1832 created a fundamental shift in the political system despite 
the relatively small expansion of the franchise.  To many Tories it destroyed their conception of 
a political system based around the Church, the aristocracy and the crown.  The old system of 
party organization and elections changed with the passage of the Great Reform Bill; patronage, 
purchase, and favors were no longer central to any party’s political upkeep, as the monopoly 
over political power was withdrawn from the aristocracy.
60
  Intense Tory opposition to the Bill 
was felt in the next election with a crushing defeat to the party.  In 1831 the Tories’ held 235 
seats and the Whigs 370.  After the election of 1832, the Tories held 175 seats and the Whigs 
gained 71 seats bringing their total to 441. With the Tories’ defeat the Whigs possessed nearly 
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three quarters of the total number of seats in the House of Commons.
61
 This crushing defeat for 
the Tories was very troubling to the future of the party.
62
 Ongoing Tory opposition to the Reform 
Bill illustrated a fundamental problem that manifested itself in the elections of 1832; more than 
ever the Tories were associated with backwardness. 
  Refusal to accept what were widely viewed as much needed changes to the electoral 
system lead to an overwhelming Whig victory in 1832. The Whig victory signaled a potentially 
crippling and long-term defeat for Toryism and its supporters. From an Ultra Tory perspective 
the factors that had contributed to this decline were the reforms passed in the 1820s, most 
notably changes to the Corn Laws and relaxation of the Navigation Acts, the Repeal of the Test 
and Corporation Acts, and finally Catholic emancipation.  For Ultras each of these reforms, 
although passed by the Tory party, had contributed to an erosion of key Tory state institutions. 
This alleged erosion gave the Ultras fuel to strike against the Whig government and further 
divide the party from within. The final blow to Toryism was the intense opposition to the Great 
Reform Bill. By opposing the expansion of the franchise and the removal of corrupt boroughs the 
Tories had aligned themselves with the forces of repression. The political chaos initiated by the 
Reform Bill sent Toryism further on the path of self-destructive behavior. To combat these self-
inflicted injuries, less reactionary Tories sought to return the party to what it resembled before 
1832.  The ‘liberal’ Tory faction of the party, lead informally by Peel, would work to undo the 
recent failures of the party. 
To transform Toryism, Peel and others had suggested a new name and label for the party 
in the post-Reform Bill world. The transformative label that arose was ‘conservative’. 
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‘Conservative’ had its first use by John Wilson Croker in an issue of the Quarterly Review in 
1830 as a description of the Tory party.
63
  He and other Tory politicians had argued that in order 
to create a stronger party they must work to preserve and ‘conserve’ the institutions of the state; 
such as the rights of the Crown,  the rights of the state church, and the rights of the landed class. 
Croker’s term for the party crept slowly into favor and began to be utilized by other Tories as a 
way to shift away from the now problematic Tory label. Conservativism would be about the 
protection and conservation of the institutions of the state through reforms that would work 
within the existing institution to preserve it rather than change it fundamentally or destroy it. 
The formation of local ‘conservative’ associations after the Tory defeat in 1832 began to 
bring Tories together to discuss the future of the party in a post-Reform Bill era. These 
associations were founded along the lines of parliamentary constituencies and were funded by 
local members. As Philip Salmon argued, the formation of these associations was inspired by 
‘conservative’ thinking individuals who had evaluated the new electorate and consciously sought 
newer methods to revive Toryism in the post Reform Bill era.
64
 Of these associations, the most 
influential was the Carlton Club. The Carlton Club quickly became the central think tank of 
‘conservative’ minded individuals.  Salmon argues that the organization of the Club in 1832 
began to help revive the Tory party from the ground up.
65
 The Carlton Club and like-minded 
conservative associations after 1832 played a vital role in selecting Conservative candidates, 
canvassing and financing the party.  These ground level changes initiated by the Carlton Club 
and other conservative associations played an important role in the transformation of Toryism 
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into Conservativism.  Their bottom-up redevelopment of Toryism after the Reform Bill meant 
that the Tories themselves knew they had to change. While Peel remained the grand architect of 
later Conservativism, the reorganization of the Tories from the ground level began with the local 
political clubs.
66
   
What was clear for the Tories after the passage of the Reform Bill was that the party had 
to change and adapt if it were to survive in the new world of British politics.  Croker’s 
suggestion for a ‘conservative’ label and the formation of conservative clubs and associations 
began a return to Pittite Toryism that started with Liverpool’s ‘liberal’ Tory era.
67
  However, to 
change the electorate’s (as well as the public’s) perception of the Tory party from one of 
repression to one that worked primarily to preserve state institutions, a new generation would 
have to lead the charge.  The figurehead for this transformation would be Robert Peel.  
Peel’s leadership of the remaining Tories began with a recommendation from the Duke of 
Wellington.  With the dismissal of Lord Melbourne’s Whig government by King William IV in 
late 1834, the Duke of Wellington was asked by the King to form a government.  He declined the 
offer; instead he suggested that the young star of the Tory party, Robert Peel, take the office of 
Prime Minister.
68
  Wellington’s reluctance to take the office of PM and his endorsement of Peel 
suggests that in his mind Peel would be a better candidate to revive Toryism. Whereas 
Wellington represented the old Tory party, Peel was to be representative of something new. 
Before Peel, the Tory party had been associated with the landed aristocrats, minor gentry and the 
established Anglican Church.  Peel, however, was an industrialist rather than a landlord and it 
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was believed that his background outside of the traditional Tory realm would help lead to the 
transformation and modernization that would turn the Tories into Conservatives.
69
  
Peel’s first order of business was to explain what his polices would be as the first Tory to 
take office since the passage of the Reform Bill. Upon accepting the call to take the office of 
Prime Minister in early December of 1834 Peel drafted his platform, aptly named after his 
constituency in Tamworth, the Tamworth Manifesto.
70
 Peel began to fundamentally change the 
political discourse of British politics through this manifesto. Tamworth Conservativism, as 
defined by Robert Peel, outlined the economic, political, and social arguments for the party as a 
revitalization of Toryism. Peel’s Manifesto remains by far one of the most significant ideological 
statements of early nineteenth century British politics.  Delivered as a supposedly nonpartisan 
speech on December 18, 1834, before his electors at the Borough of Tamworth, this manifesto 
outlined the fundamental structures for his new Conservative party and ministry.
71
  Although 
delivered to the electors at Tamworth, the main points were addressed to the electorate at large. 
Peel realized that since the passage of the Reform Bill national politics had fundamentally 
changed.
72
  With a national audience in mind Peel’s Manifesto outlined a new direction for the 
Tories based on the reformed electorate.
73
 Peel’s idea of a national Conservative party was one 
that could act on behalf of the nation regardless of levels of enfranchisement. The principles he 
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enunciated in the new party canon centered on the maintenance and careful reform of the 
traditional institutions of church, state, and economy.
74
  
To simply change the name of the party from Tory to Conservative was not the goal.  
Peel believed that a reformation of the Tory party into a ‘conservative’ one would be the best 
way to combat radicalism and block radical Whig reforms.
75
 Additionally, Peel believed that 
certain reforms were necessary and that his new party should carry out reforms that were in the 
national interest. Peel believed that Toryism, especially the principles and polices that began 
with ‘liberal’ Toryism, with its strong commitment to the state, church, crown and pursuit of 
necessary reform, would be a firm base for his new party.
76
 His objective in designing the 
Conservative party was to help maintain these important state organizations. It was, in Peel’s 
opinion, the positon of the ministers of government to lead, not to follow.
77
 Peel argued that a 
Conservative government would not be led by public opinion or party doctrine but rather by 
what it considered to be in the best interests of the nation. Additionally he stated that the Tories’ 
refusal to pursue and accept reforms had essentially led them to extinction by sticking to a pure 
party doctrine rather than working towards the larger national interest.
78
 Peel had argued that 
Whig radicals had been strongly influenced by the press and public agitation; therefore, they 
were following and adhering to the ‘vilest species of despotisms- the despotism of 
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  Clearly in his mind, a strong government or party should not unthinkingly bend 
to the demands of the public or press. Conservative MP’s were to be representatives of the 
electorate, responsible for making decision for the good of the whole, not party delegates told 
how to vote.
80
 Since the passage of the Reform Bill Peel had criticized the Whigs for enacting a 
host of unnecessary reforms, which did not truly help the nation.
81
 He argued that by following 
the public’s demands for immediate action the Whigs were undermining the constitution. His 
objective was to create a Conservative party that would help preserve and conserve crucial state 
institutions and work for the national interest. 
Peel’s argument for a Conservative government suggested that it had to be accepting of 
reforms already enacted and in some cases actively pursue further needed reforms. As Croker 
had suggested to Peel more than a decade earlier, reforms should be undertaken, but carefully.
82
 
This careful approach meant that state institutions could undergo careful review that could 
inform well-constructed measures of reform. Peel argued that reforms were also to be opposed if 
they were against national interests.  Still, such opposition, Peel argued, had to be carefully 
managed. The Conservative party should pick and choose its fights and selectively oppose 
unnecessary measures.
83
  He argued that unnecessary reforms to state institutions were not only 
dangerous but also irresponsible. This notion of selective opposition illustrated that Peel’s 
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Conservative party was constructing a hierarchy of principles.  Some things were of greater 
importance than others and required strong defense.  Therefore, Peel’s idea of a careful and 
selective approach to reform established a basis on which the party could oppose or support 
reforms to institutions of the state and serve as a basis for the ideology of Conservativism.  
Changing the party name from Tory to Conservative was part of Peel’s attempt to create 
not only a new image but an entirely new political discourse for the party. Peel’s objective was 
not only to distance his new party from the narrow ideas of the old Tory party but also to 
revitalize what he viewed as the positive elements of Toryism; most notably its commitment to 
national institutions of church and state. Peel had no time for the Ultras and his dislike of them 
ran deep.  He argued that their narrow-mindedness and failure to look at the interests of the 
nation were not only damaging but also distressing.
84
His party’s design, outlined in the 
Manifesto, was to conserve the institutions of the state and guide them into the future.
85
  
The Manifesto directly outlined the general goals and directions of Peel’s first 
government.
86
 However, his manifesto would have consequences that went far beyond outlining 
the objectives of a single ministry. The manifesto dictated four critical aims that were designed 
to appeal to the new electorate in the post-Reform Bill era.  These four principles were: 
acceptance of the Reform Bill as irrevocable; a willingness to pursue further needed reforms, 
both civil and ecclesiastical; the preservation of the church; and a refusal to accept reforms that 
were unnecessary or so radical they undermined the very nature of British society. 
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 The first and most crucial section of the Manifesto was Peel’s explicit support for the 
Reform Bill, stating that it was an irrevocable piece of legislation.
87
 Peel’s stance on the Reform 
Bill in the manifesto clearly defined his political position from then on. Declaring that with the 
passage of the Reform Bill British politics had entered a new era, Peel argued that it was the 
responsibility of the Prime Minister to both maintain the Bill and act in the spirt of it.  This first 
section of Peel’s manifesto clearly articulates his ‘liberal’ Tory attitudes and dislike of Ultra 
Toryism: 
Now I say at once that I will not accept power on the condition of declaring 
myself an apostate from the principles on which I have heretofore acted. At the 
same time, I never will admit that I have been, either before or after the Reform 




Peel’s alignment with the Reform Bill illustrated his commitment to modernizing the Tories in 
line with the new age of politics. Peel argued that the Bill had settled the issue of corruption in 
politics in a positive fashion and that any attempts by either Conservatives or Whigs to undo its 
work would be against the national interest.
89
 Aligning himself with the Reform Bill Peel made it 
clear that the new and enlarged national electorate was his party’s target audience. 
Second, Peel argued for his Conservatives to review state institutions in the “spirit” of the 
Reform Bill. He argued that:  
[I]f the spirit of the Reform Bill implies merely a careful review of institutions, 
civil and ecclesiastical, undertaken in a friendly temper combining, with the firm 
maintenance of established rights, the correction of proved abuses and the redress 
of real grievances, - in that case, I can for myself and colleagues undertake to act 
in such a spirit and with such intentions.
90
 
















Peel’s Manifesto addressed the notion of reform both civil and ecclesiastical but also clearly 
stated that it would be limited in its extent. He stated that the Reform Bill did not require a 
massive overhaul of the state but a series of careful reviews.
91
 Review and then reform to state 
institutions both civil and ecclesiastical broke with the old idea of Toryism and its unyielding 
opposition to changing state institutions in any way, shape or form. As a reflection of his own 
Conservativism Peel had argued that his government would have to be proactive and enact 
change where there was both a perceived need and a strong case for change.
92
  Similar to his 
involvement in the debate over Catholic emancipation in 1829, Peel believed that the best way to 
maintain both the authority of the Church and state was through reform that addressed the 
grievances of the nation.
93
 
 Third, he wanted his reformed Tory party to stand for the active preservation and 
improvement of current institutions. Thus, his positon on the Anglican Church in Ireland was to 
reform the institution of the church so it could be better promoted. 
94
 His offer to investigate the 
possibility of church reform to preserve the interests of the established church satisfied his Tory 
base but also acted within the spirit of the post-Reform Bill era.  Peel imagined his party could, 
through careful and well thought out measures of reform, guide state institutions into the present 
and promote their interests.  
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Finally, Peel argued that while his administration was in support of necessary reforms it 
would not undertake sweeping reforms that were fueled by unthinking, popular mass agitation. 
Peel had stated that if the positive spirit of the Reform Bill was to degenerate into an atmosphere 
of continual agitation and demands for massive and sweeping reforms he could not support it. 
95
 
Peel’s final point in the Manifesto conceived his intent to establish a modern government that 
could act for the good of the entire nation, regardless of the level of enfranchisement. Although 
seemingly democratic, Tamworth Conservativism wasn’t.  His Conservativism was about the 
maintenance and preservation of state institutions and pursuit of reforms that worked within the 
existing system to address problems and correct them for the good of the nation.  
The overall message in Peel’s Manifesto was to accept reforms for the good of the nation.  
Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism had to take into account the changes instituted by the Reform 
Bill and had to embrace them as irrevocable and necessary for the party’s transition from 
Toryism into Conservativism.
96
 The ideas addressed in the Manifesto, inspired by the Reform 
Bill, represented Peel’s notion of a Conservative government. “Conservative government” as 
Peel had called it, reflected his intentions to govern in the spirt of reformed ‘liberal’ Toryism. 
Aligning himself with the spirit of the Reform Bill Peel made it clear that the newly reconstituted 
and enhanced national electorate was his party’s target audience. Obstructive opposition by the 
Ultra Tories after the passage of the Reform Bill had brought the party to the brink of extinction.  
Peel had observed these problems and offered cautious reforms as a compromise to revitalize the 
party, while still maintaining support of state institutions. Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism took 
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The ideas set forth in the Manifesto presented Peel’s vision of a Conservative 
government. By accepting the ideals behind the Reform Bill, Peel’s Tamworth Conservatism 
launched a new political discourse. The new Conservative party was one that embraced the 
Reform Bill as irrevocable and believed that attempts to undo it were threats to the peace and 
security of the nation.
98
  Peel clearly saw himself and his new Conservative Party as the 
ideological successors of ‘liberal’ Toryism, because it too had accepted cautious reform in the 
1820s. Drawing from the fundamental basis of ‘liberal’ Toryism the Manifesto sought to draw in 




The government that started with the Tamworth Manifesto was to operate in a new 
Conservative fashion.  Peel’s first ministry was a minority government and had to rely on Whig 
support.  However, the Whigs who supported Peel were often skeptical of his Tory background 
and because of this Peel  could never be certain of their support; indeed, the Whig supporters of 
Peel’s government eventually broke off and joined with the Irish radicals to defeat Peel’s 
government.
100
 By early April 1835, Peel could no longer continue his minority government and 
reluctantly resigned, allowing Lord Melbourne and the Whigs to return to office.  
Although the first Peel ministry lasted only one hundred days, it had created the 
foundation for a new political organization. The collapse after one hundred days in office 
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illustrated the fragility of the newly organized party but in the long term helped to forge stronger 
party discipline.
101
 The withdrawal into opposition gave Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism a 
chance to evolve into a more detailed and well-defined party canon which in turn allowed for a 
more fully articulated Conservative party ideology. Peel’s first ministry, although short, was a 
relatively successful first test of Conservativism as a national party idea. In this sense, the 
collapse of Peel’ first ministry was not really a failure but rather a case of a premature ascent to 
power.  The resignation of Conservative government ministers on April 8, 1835 was met with 
cheers of support for Peel.
102
 Although defeated Peel had successfully rallied support for his new 
Conservative idea. The first Conservative ministry ended in perhaps the best way possible for 
Peel and his supporters. Peel’s Conservatives as well as his non-partisan supporters within the 
House of Commons marched triumphantly to the opposition benches.  As the session ended Peel 
was met with cheers from both opponents and supporters all around the House.
103
 While Peel had 
not had the numbers in 1835 to form a strong ministry, he had rallied the support necessary for 
the formation of a strong opposition. It was evident that despite the party’s inability to hold on to 
the reins of  government it clearly had strong influence within parliament which was a vast 
improvement over the years from 1832 to 1834 when the party had almost disappeared into 
political irrelevancy.
104
 Peel’s move to the opposition benches allowed him and his follower’s 
time to rally support, build internal ideology, identity, and to attract new members to the party.  
In opposition, Tamworth Conservatism proved to be a successful basis for rallying more support 
and strengthening the party ideology.  
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Seen in that light, the first Peel ministry was a victory for the idea of Tamworth 
Conservatism despite its short run. The immediate effects of the Manifesto were minimal. 
However, the long-term ramifications of the manifesto were huge.  The results of the elections of 
1835 and 1837 showed a strong Conservative rise, which would continue into the elections of 
1841 allowing Peel to form a majority government. The tenets of the Manifesto and his first 
ministry helped to convince the electors around the country, and fellow Tories, that Peel could 
and should be trusted as the leader of this new Conservative party. Peel had managed to revive 
the still beating heart of Toryism and transform it into a new national idea– Conservatism. Peel 
had not only revived the ideology from the brink but he had also successfully removed, or 
restrained, many of the rotten branches associated with the most reactionary strains of Ultra 
Toryism.  Peel’s Tamworth Conservatism had passed the first test in establishing itself as a 
viable political ideology and successor to ‘liberal’ Toryism. However, to expand the party, Peel 
had to purge or at the very least further restrain the most reactionary forces in the party.  His 
ultimate solution was to dilute the influence of the Ultras by recruiting large numbers of 
moderate Conservative converts and ex-Whigs to the Conservative party standard. 
 
Converts to Peel’s Conservative Party: Edward Smith-Stanley and the Derby Dilly 
Peel’s 1834 reformation of the Tories launched the new Conservative movement, but if 
he was going to create a truly new type of political party he needed more than traditional Tory 
support.  It was imperative that he bring in ex-Whig members to his cause, largely to dilute the 
continued threat of Ultra Toryism.  High on the list of potential candidates for his new party was 
Edward George Geoffrey Smith-Stanley.  Lord Stanley’s role in the formation of the 
Conservative party has often been underrated despite his later service as the leader of the party 
43 
  
and Prime Minister.  His alliance with Peel would help further Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism 
as the official brand of Conservativism for the party. 
 Lord Stanley’s political career began in the Whig party and he was an active member of 
Lord Grey’s government (1831) as Chief Secretary for Ireland (an office occupied twenty years 
earlier by Robert Peel). As a more ‘conservative’ member of the Whig party Stanley had been a 
cautious supporter of the Reform Bill to expand the franchise.  However, the measure that broke 
his confidence with the Whigs was the reform of the Church of Ireland.  After 1832, he saw the 
Whig’s as having fragmented into thousands of distinct factions with no real organization.
105
 His 
exit from the Whigs was accompanied by that of fellow members of the Grey government Sir 
James Graham, Lord George Bentinck, Lord Ripon
106
 and the Duke of Richmond.
107
  Together 
these men rallied around Stanley and were called the Stanleyites, Dillyites or the Derby Dilly.
 108
  
The Dillyites or the Derby Dilly was a reference to both Stanley as the future 14
th
 Earl of Derby 
and Dilly as slang for Diligence. These Conservative Whigs under Lord Stanley broke with the 
Whig leader in the Commons, John Russell, over a perceived radicalization within the party. 
Each of these ex-Whigs were logical targets for inclusion in Peel’s Conservative party because of 
their (especially Lord Stanley’s) “adherence to the Conservative but yet liberal 
principles.”
109
Stanley’s transformation into a Conservative was not a simple conversion but 
rather was part of the larger reorganization of British politics after the passage of the Reform 
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Bill. As a crucial part of the creation of Conservativism, Peel needed Stanley and other ex-Whigs 
to broaden Conservativism beyond reformed Toryism.  
The formation of Stanley’s Derby Dilly arose from his installation as Lord Rector of 
Glasgow University on December 21
st
 1834. The political ideas that he articulated in his 
installation speech became known as the Knowsley Creed.
110
  The creed advocated for 
moderation, careful reform, and strong government. The publication of Peel’s Tamworth 
Manifesto three days earlier on December 18
th
 stole the thunder that Stanley was hoping to 
capture by creating a center party. With Peel beating him to the punch, Stanley’s Knowsley 
Creed had seemed more like an imitation of Peel’s support of moderate politics rather than the 
creation of an original platform by Stanley.
111
 Peel’s Conservativism and Stanley’s Knowsley 
Creed, were at their core, very similar.  Both reflected the popular idea of necessary reform for 
the good of the nation.   
Both Peel and Stanley nationally published their speeches to express the message of a 
moderate approach to reform. To the assembled crowd, Stanley stated that the spirit of 
moderation prevailed around the country. 
112
 Moderation, selective reform, and the preservation 
of state institutions were all key elements of Stanley’s beliefs, and like Peel, he articulated the 
idea of a careful approach to reform.  In the context of the post-Reform Bill era Stanley was 
cautious of reforms and was well aware of Whig measures that targeted crucial state institutions.  
It was his belief that these were not reforms but acts of willful destruction which had to be 
blocked.  As he put it, “I will oppose with all the might and energy of which I am capable those 
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whose measure, whose objects, and whose intentions are not intended to reform, but to 
destroy.”
113
 His argument was that, under the pretext of reform, members of the Whig party had 
created ‘reforms’ that undermined the national interests and institutions.  Stanley argued that 
these should be opposed, as they were not actually reforms.  However, Stanley was not opposed 
to reform in the slightest. He remained committed to addressing grievances and correcting 
systems of government to work more effectively. 
While a strong supporter of the idea of reform Stanley, like Peel, suggested that if reform 
was not undertaken with due consideration to the maintenance of crucial state institutions it 
would be problematic.  Additionally, Stanley argued that it would be impossible to engage in 
reactionary reverses. Changes like the Great Reform Act were permanent: “On these principles it 
was that I acted with the government of Earl Grey in favour of a reform.”
114
Unlike Peel, who had 
originally opposed the Reform Bill, Stanley had always embraced its design of expanding the 
franchise beyond the aristocracy. However, Stanley opposed the later reforms passed by the 
Whigs as being excessive and counter to the protection of the core institutions of the state. The 
reform that precipitated his and others exit from the Whig party dealt with the relationship of the 
state church in Ireland. Stanley believed that the state and church was under attack across the 
nation under the guise of reform. In his creed, he called for the preservation of these institutions 
through continued maintenance.
115
  Stanley argued for a defense of the state church in the 
following terms, 
Are those the institutions which ought to be treated by Government with 
indifference or non-interference?  It ought to be the first duty of a Government to 
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extend religious knowledge and see that the people by means of establishments 
had the power of obtaining instruction and religious comfort.
116
 
Stanley’s defense of the state church argued that it should be respected and maintained as a 
central part of the country.  
Still, the Knowsley Creed, unlike Peel’s Tamworth Manifesto, was not a founding party 
document but a suggestion for new type of politics in a post Reform Bill era.  His creed, like 
Peel’s Manifesto expressed the new political atmosphere that was surrounding politics in the 
wake of the Reform Bill.  Stanley argued that the preservation of state institutions should be a 
high priority. However as he argued in his creed,   
These institutions are respected, and ought to be maintained and upheld in the 
love and attention of the country; but while I say this, I am not blind to the defects 
which at present exist, and which I am anxious to see removed- for by such means 
do I wish to disarm our enemies, conciliate our opponents and increase our 
friends. But it is not our sacred institutions alone I wish to see reformed; it is the 
whole range of civic institution which I desire to see amended but not altered for 




Stanley concluded his Knowsley Creed with a suggestion that a national leader and a defender of 
the constitution should be willing to pursue necessary and careful reform. 
118
 His goal in the 
Knowsley Creed wasn’t directly to establish a centrist party between the radical Whigs and the 
Tories, but rather to suggest that there was room for one. However, with much of his thunder 
stolen by Peel’s similar message Stanley’s attempt to organize many of his followers into their 
own party became a difficult task.   
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When William IV called upon Peel to form a government in December 1834, Peel 
immediately approached Stanley and inquired if he would be willing to serve as a member of his 
new Conservative ministry. In his reply Stanley stated: “I acknowledge that recent events have 
narrowed the ground of difference which heretofore divided us”
119
  However, despite becoming 
closer politically Stanley refused to enter into an alliance with Peel.  Stanley’s hesitancy seemed 
to center around his concerns that Peel’s Conservative party was just a new form of Toryism.
120
 
In correspondence with one another over Peel’s hundred-day ministry, both Peel and Stanley 
agreed how close ideologically they were to one another. Still, Peel’s early attempts to draw in 
the Dillyite forces were met with outright rejection.  In correspondence with Stanley’s right hand 
man, Sir James Graham, Peel had requested a union between the factions. Graham, in deference 
to Stanley, had politely declined and returned Peels’ offer stating, “in our peculiar position we 
think it right to return your packet unopened.”
121
 Peel’s response to Graham’s decline was that he 
hoped the group would eventually reconsider.
122
Peel’s first attempt to draw in these potential 
‘conservative’ forces was premature.  His Tamworth Conservativism was still too new while his 
support from the Tories aroused suspicions that Peel’s Conservative Party was simply a renamed 
Tory party.  However, as Peel’s first government neared its end Stanley and his supporters 
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became more open towards Peel’s Conservativism and saw it less as a version of Toryism and 
certainly preferable to the radicalism of the Whigs.
123
 
Peel’s later attempts to bring the Derby Dilly into the Conservative fold would often 
suggest that an alliance between the two, rather than a simple union, might prove beneficial in 
the future.
124
  Stanley’s response to these advances was typically silence. Peel’s later careful 
attempts gave the illusion that the Dillityes would maintain independence in an alliance rather 
than be suborned in a union.  However, both Stanly and Peel realized that the continuation of a 
third party was not a long-term option and a union, with either the Whigs or the Conservatives, 
was seemingly inevitable. The results of the 1835 election drove this home, as they were 
particularly bad news for Stanley’s Derby Dilly party.  The success of the Conservative party in 
early 1835 meant that Stanley’s long-term plan to form an independent party was going to be 
difficult to realize. 
By the spring of 1835, Stanley’s supporters began to shift towards an alliance with Peel 
after John Russell’s Whigs formalized their union with O’Connell and the Irish radicals.
125
 This 
union pushed Stanley and his supporters further away from a return to the Whigs and closer 
towards Peel and his Conservatives.  In correspondence with the Duke of Wellington Sir Henry 
Hardinge indicated that he believed that Graham and, most importantly, Stanley were beginning 
to shift towards an alliance with Peel’s Party.  When referring to his conversation with Graham, 
Hardinge stated, “His conversation was very Conservative, with a conviction that the difficulties 
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of the Melbourne Government were so great that it can hardly outlive the session.”
126
 
Wellington’s response suggested that the coming alliance (not quite a union) with Stanley’s 
Derby Dilly could prove beneficial for Peel’s party, particularly in upcoming elections.  
Wellington believed that the relative similarities between the two groups was growing stronger 
and that “ my own conviction is that we are looking to the same objects, and feel much more 
interested in protecting the monarch, and the public interests involved in its security.”
127
  
Continued independence of the Dillyites gradually declined after Peel’s hundred days in 
office.  The cheers that echoed around the House for Peel as he left office signaled the coming 
end to Stanley as an independent figure outside of the two parties. Lord Melbourne’s new 
government could hardly count on the Dillyites for support after Russell’s strategic union with 
O’Connell.  To the Dillyites a return to Whig party became a less realistic option with every 
passing day.  Stanley acknowledged that his hopes of an independent third party were coming to 
an end.  In his own words, Stanley noted, “The formation of ‘the Dilly’ depended upon the 
balance of parties being such that a section comparatively triflingly in numbers, could exercise a 
powerful influence over a weak government… But no calculations can lead us to flatter 
ourselves that one can exercise any such influence now.”
128
   
The end of the Derby Dilly was not a simple merger with the Conservative party and the 
resistance from some of Stanley’s supporters lasted well after Stanley himself had suggested a 
union with Peel’s Conservative party.  The Duke of Richmond in numerous letters to Stanley 
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suggested that it would be highly unlikely he would seek office again even if Peel were to defeat 
Melbourne’s government.
129
 The most peculiar support of Lord Stanley came in the form of a 
letter submitted to The Times on February 6
th
 1836.  In the letter, Stanley was labeled a viable 
candidate for a future Prime Ministership, as well as a brilliant current political leader. The 
author praised many of Stanley’s actions since 1834 (especially his refusal to join Peel) as 
“honourable, and in defence of the prosperity of the nation rather than to gratify his own 
ambition.”
130
 Signed simply ‘Runnymede’ the author was in reality the debt-ridden novelist and 
future Conservative MP Benjamin Disraeli.   
Stanley’s move to the Conservative benches was met with resistance from his own 
members and a final division of the Dillyites between the Whigs and Conservatives.  The 
division of the Dillyites by the end of December 1837 was finalized and despite Stanley’s union 
with Peel many of his Dillyites returned to the Whig party.  The leading members of the Dillyite 
party who joined Peel were Lord George Bentinck, James Graham, the Duke of Richmond and 
Lord Ripon.  Others returned to Whig party under John Russell, but with clear-cut reservations 
about the alliance with Irish radicals.
 131
  With Stanley’s party dissolved Peel acted quickly to 
welcome the Derby faction into his Conservative party.  This was exactly what Peel had hoped 
for in his Tamworth Manifesto, the inclusion of moderates into the fold. Stanley’s conversion to 
Conservativism was gradual and his similarities with Peel, concerning his ideas of selective 
reform, and the necessity to reform for the national good were welcomed. However, many of the 
Dillyites still did not trust Peel and Graham in particular often called out Peel’s shortcomings.  
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Knowing that Graham was Stanley’s right hand man Peel knew that Graham’s concerns were 
also Stanley’s.  Therefore when Peel listened to Graham and acted accordingly he was thereby 
attempting to win over Stanley.
132
  An example of this was when Peel drafted a bill to reform 
Irish municipal corporations to localize control.  Both Stanley and Graham had supported the 
localization of Irish municipalities. Their support of improving government in Ireland through an 
Irish Municipal Reform Act (municipal reform had passed in England and Wales in 1835) 
illustrated their commitment to a particular form of Conservatism. Although this Bill was 
defeated Peel gained the formal support of Stanley and the Dillyites for a union by the end of the 
year.
133
 Peel’s adjustment of Conservative policy to secure Stanley’s long-term support 
illustrated his commitment to necessary reform (even to his own ideas) to maintain stability and 
success within his party.   
Peel’s acquisition of the Dillyites to the Conservative cause set the precedent for his 
national objective of a future Conservative government. In the years immediately after the party 
was formed it achieved massive gains in the elections of 1835 and 1837. Earning close to one 
hundred new seats in 1835 the Conservatives greatly reduced the gap between them and the 
Whigs. Table 1 illustrates the Conservative seats gained in the elections since 1832. It is to be 
noted that while the Party was officially labeled Conservative in 1834 the 1832 results apply to 
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Conservative Election results 1832-1841 
 1832 1835 1837 1841 
England 471 129 209 244 283 
Scotland 53 10 15 20 22 
Wales 29 13 17 18 19 
Ireland 105 33 38 32 43 
Total 658 175 273 314 367 
Table 1 Conservatives returned in elections between Peel governments
134
 
Peel’s success in 1837 came partially from the acquisition of ex-Whigs but was also the result of 
the national respect he began to receive as a leader. 
Offering a dramatic turnaround from the Tories’ disastrous defeat in 1832 Peel’s 
Tamworth Conservativism had indeed worked.  However, Peel noted that the party still remained 
fragile.  The Ultra Tories only tolerated Peel’s leadership and the Dillyites did not fully trust 
Peel, but certainly approved of him over Russell and O’Connell.  Peel’s challenge during the 
remainder of the 1830s was to bring together the various types of ‘conservatives’ and unify them 
under the mantle of his Tamworth Conservativism.  As he stated 1837, 
Few people can judge the difficulty there has frequently been of maintaining 
harmony between the various branches of the Conservative Party — the great 
majority in the House of Lords and the minority in the House of Commons 




Peel’s new Conservative party in the 1830s was the union of Ultra Tories, ‘liberal’ Tories and 
ex-Whigs.  These three different groups together under one Conservative umbrella was a very 
difficult group for Peel to manage.  To unify these three Peel had to make his brand of 
Conservativism the most appealing option.  His attempts to do this consisted of appeasing the 
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Ultra Tories through the appointment of the Ultra Sir Edward Knatchball to his 1834 ministry 
and cementing his alliance with Stanley by taking the side of the Derby Dilly and pursuing Irish 
municipal reform.  Peel’s calculated moves during his leadership of the new Conservative party 
earned him allies from the right and the left. However, a definition of Conservativism was still a 
huge question.  What was it that made Conservativism different from Toryism, ‘liberal’ Toryism, 
or even Whiggism? These questions plagued both Stanley’s Dillyites and the Ultra Tories. 
For Peel’s Ultra Tory critics his Conservativism and its’ so called development were 
dubious. The Duke of Newcastle stated that ‘the only difference between Sir Robert Peel and 
Lord John Russell is that one would only give a handful where the other would give 
bushels’.
136
Newcastle’s Ultra Tory perspective argued that the ‘liberal’ Tory Peel and the Whig 
John Russell were very similar with only minor differences. In his 1844 political novel, 
Coningsby or the New Generation Benjamin Disraeli critiqued Peel’s actions during the 1830s 
and particularly the way he had formed his Conservative party.  While Disraeli wrote Coningsby 
a decade after the events of 1834, given his role in later internal party struggles, his criticism of 
Peel’s Conservative party nonetheless remains important for historical analysis.  Disraeli had 
argued that Peel’s Conservativism had been a vain attempt to reform Toryism with ‘liberal’ 
Whig values.
137
 In his novel, the discussion between the characters Tadpole and Taper illustrated 
a particular criticism of Peel’s Conservative party.  Disraeli’s characters suggested that Peel’s 
party was abandoning Tory values in favor of popular Whig measures: 
‘True, terribly true,' said Mr. Taper. 'That we should ever live to see a Tory 
government again! We have reason to be very thankful.' 
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'Hush!' said Mr. Tadpole. 'The time has gone by for Tory governments; what the 
country requires is a sound Conservative government.' 
'A sound Conservative government,' said Taper, musingly. 'I understand: Tory 




Critiques like those found in Coningsby were not far from the truth.  Between 1834 and 
1841many Tories suggested that Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism was abandoning Tory 
principles simply to curry favor with the new electorate.  While many of Peel’s followers had 
attached themselves to this smart political strategy, others felt the abandonment of principles was 
damaging to the future of a Conservative party. Disraeli like other Conservatives, (Stanley 
included) had asked the natural question ‘if Conservative principles are about preservation and 
conservation how will that be achieved through the act of reform?’
139
 
Peel tackled this criticism frequently and suggested that reform was an active way to 
preserve state institutions.  Often his Conservative party was suggested to be ‘a party without 
principles’ or a group of ‘Tory men with Whig values’. Peel responded to his critics that his 
Conservativism had its own principles that separated it from the old Tory party. In defense of his 
Conservative idea, Peel argued that his party had a firm set of principles that were grounded in 
Toryism but were Conservative in their own way: 
By conservative principles I mean, a maintenance of the settled institutions of 
church and state, and I mean also the maintenance, defence, and continuation of 
those laws, those institutions, that society, and those habits and manners which 
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Peel’s argument with party critics suggested that what he saw as Conservativism was different 
from Toryism. ‘Maintenance of settled institutions of church and state’ meant that reform was 
necessary to preserve them and guide them into the future.
141
  Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism 
was not about the continuation of the Status Quo ante; instead it called for a transformation and 
modernization of Tory social values. Despite Peel’s argument for Conservatism and his electoral 
success many members of his party still harbored serious suspicions of the man and his 
‘principles’. 
*** 
According to Gash’s interpretation, the formation of Peel’s Conservative party in the 
mid-1830s suggested that Peel had reformed Toryism through the Tamworth Manifesto into a 
pragmatic centrist party. The inclusion of Lord Stanley into the fold was the primary evidence of 
this pragmatism by Peel. Conversely, Hilton had argued that Peel’s inclusion of ex-Whigs was 
designed to help support his ‘liberal’ Tory doctrine and alienate the Ultras, furthering his 
‘Conservativism’ as the defining ideology of his new party.  Hilton argues that Peel’s inclusion 
of Stanley and the Dillyites was necessary to further these ‘liberal’ ideological doctrines.  
However, while these authors argue that Peel acted either as a liberal wolf in sheep’s clothing or 
was simply a political pragmatist, this study maintains that the Conservativism Peel professed 
emerged more as a synthesis of old Whig policies (after being passed through the filter of Peel’s 
‘liberal’ Toryism) and Tory the social values that Peel believed his party was to defend. 
 The significance of Peel’s Tamworth Manifesto and its transformation of the Tory party 
cannot be underestimated.  Between his first and second Ministries, Peel had successfully 
reversed the Tories electoral defeat of 1832, and revived and transformed Toryism into a 
successful post-Reform Bill political party. Attaining high office for Peel during the 1830s was 





about maintaining and securing a sense of stability after the Tory collapse in 1832.  Peel’s 
Tamworth Manifesto outlined not only the objectives of his first ministry but of his new, more 
broadly-based Conservative movement.  The addition of ex-Whigs into the Conservative party 
brought about what Peel had aimed for in designing a post-Reform Bill party.  Peel politics 
starting in 1830 have been observed as both pragmatic and partial to the ‘liberal’ Tory political 
doctrine.  His consistencies with the ‘liberal’ Tory movement a decade earlier illustrate that his 
Tamworth Conservativism was the logical evolution of these ideas.  Conservativism’s dual 
principles – the necessity of reform for the national interest (as defined by Peel) and the 
maintenance of state institutions through careful reform– were the basis of his Tamworth 
























TAMWORTH CONSERVATIVISM FROM TRIUMPH TO TRAGEDY: THE SECOND 
PEEL MINISTRY AND THE CORN LAW CRISIS  
 The 1841 election resulted in a Conservative government and a personal victory for Peel. 
Securing a Conservative majority in the Commons vindicated his Conservative idea and, in his 
mind, illustrated that the Tories were being transformed into a new party.
142
  After the results of 
the general election were finalized Peel stated: “If I exercise power, it shall be upon my 
conception - perhaps imperfect, perhaps mistaken, but my sincere conception - of public 
duty.”
143
 Peel’s commitment as Prime Minister from the start of his second ministry was based 
upon his sense of public duty.  He felt that as the Prime Minister his duty was to the Monarch, 
his conscience, and the nation rather than only to the Conservative party.
144
 Peel’s pursuits of 
reforms over the course of his second ministry would receive both praise and criticism.  His 
Tamworth Conservativism stood for firmness, moderation, and sound judgment to help guide the 
institutions of the state (the Church, the aristocracy, and the Monarchy) into the present age.   
The fundamental problem at the start of Peel’s second ministry was the party’s lack of a 
single unifying ‘conservative’ principle, beyond the maintenance of state institutions through 
cautious, well thought-out reform. Peel had suggested in his Tamworth Manifesto (1834) that 
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every institution of the state was up for careful review. This led to a problem concerning certain 
state “institutions,” perhaps most notably those associated with the Corn Laws. Critics had 
inquired where reform would stop and to what extent the party was going to pursue reform.  If 
the Tories refused to accept reform to state institutions, then they were not becoming 
Conservatives, rather they were still the obstructionist Tories with a Conservative veneer. 
Additionally, some Conservatives worried that reform was simply a type of Whig appeasement.  
Peel’s commitments to Tory principles were often doubted. His actions on Catholic 
Emancipation in 1829 and his suggestion in 1834 that no institution of the state was safe from 
reform stood as examples. Some Conservative party members had intimated that Peel’s 
‘conservative’ principles were not very concrete and that maintenance through reform was not a 
long-term plan to ‘conserve’ state institutions like the church and the aristocracy.  As a result, the 
next five years would be challenging ones for Peel, as he worked to keep his conservative forces 
unified in the face of several crises. 
 
The Second Peel Ministry Reform and the Corn Laws 
The general election of 1841 saw Peel’s party gain 53 seats, pushing its seat total from 
314 to 367, thereby providing the Conservatives with a majority government.
145
 Peel’s return to 
the office of Prime Minister was in his mind a confirmation of the success of his Conservative 
idea.  His electoral triumph brought the first majority for the Conservatives/Tories since the 
passage of the Reform Bill nine years earlier. However, the Conservative triumph of 1841 was 
slowly undercut by the growing problems associated with the Corn Laws.  Pressure from the 
newly formed Anti-Corn Law League (1838) had forced Peel and his Conservative party to deal 
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with the Corn Law issue in the general election. The problem of the Corn Laws and 
protectionism for Peel in 1841 has been a long debated and heavily politicized topic.  Some 
historians have argued that Peel had converted to free trade well before 1841.
 146
  Other scholars 
have suggested that by 1841 Peel experienced his first serious doubts concerning the 
protectionist doctrine.
 147
 Whatever Peel’s true position on protection in 1841, it remains 
important to note that his earlier mentions of protectionism indicated that reform must be 
pursued to maintain the security of the state. Although protectionism was not explicitly 
mentioned, the concluding remarks of the Tamworth Manifesto stated his position on the 
economy arguing for, “the impartial consideration of what is due to all interests’ agricultural, 
manufacturing, and commercial.”
148
 Peel’s argument for a careful and impartial consideration of 
all interests when approaching reform defined his Conservatism not as pragmatic but as cautious. 
The principles concerning protectionism which Peel argued for in 1834, had not dramatically 
changed by 1841. His party’s commitment to the maintenance of protectionism would result in a 
Conservative triumph. While historians often overlook the election of 1841 (in favor of larger 
events such as Corn Law repeal in 1846), it remains critical in a study of Peel’s rise and fall over 
the course of his second ministry.     
The Conservative candidates that stood for election in 1841, as many historians have 
noted, did so on the platform of protection. Lord Ashburton wrote to Peel after the general 
election stating, “I am aware to what extent our Conservative party is a party pledged to the 
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support of the land, and that that principle abandoned the party is dissolved”
149
 In effect, he 
argued that maintenance of the Corn Laws in 1841 was an essential component of the 
Conservative platform and ideology.  However, maintenance of the Corn Laws, to many 
Conservatives, was not just a matter of continuing them in their current state. Conservatives in 
1841 would argue for reforms to improve the efficacy of the laws. Modifications to the sliding 
scale were the type of reforms that Conservatives believed would alleviate the problems with the 
Corn Laws.
150
  The sliding scale had been designed in 1828 to adjust to the rise and fall of the 
price of grain.  The Wellington government (in which Peel acted as Home Secretary) had 
introduced the concept of the sliding scale to allow foreign grain duty free importation when the 
domestic price had reached 72s per quarter. The scale was supposed to provide relief to the poor 
by potentially lowering the price of bread but, by 1841, it was having the opposite effect – 
keeping grain and therefore bread artificially high.
 151
  Calls to modify the sliding scale yet again 
actually came first from Conservative agriculturalists. They argued a modification was necessary 
to provide relief to the farmers who found it difficult to sell grain at artificially high prices. 
However, the call from the agriculturalists to modify the Corn Laws was not singular.  
Pressure from the working classes to lower the price of bread was most clearly articulated 
by the Chartists.
 152
 To the Conservatives the Chartist movement, a working class political group, 
had been a thorn in their side since its inception. While pressures from the Chartists most 
certainly influenced the election, the overall electoral importance of the working classes was 
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minimal because of restrictions to the franchise. The group that did have a large presence in the 
election was the Anti-Corn Law League. The ACLL’s attacks on what it coined the “Bread Tax” 
became a powerful weapon against the Corn Laws and their continued maintenance.
153
 An earlier 
attempt by the Whig government, in 1839, to open an inquiry into the Corn Laws had failed to 
gather sufficient support from the Whig backbenches.  While the attempt in 1839 failed to gather 
parliamentary support, it provided considerable impetus for the idea of national extra-
parliamentary agitation against the continuation of the Laws by the ACLL.
154
  One of the 
League’s most prominent spokesmen within the House was the Whig MP Charles Pelham 
Villiers.  He would, from 1838 until 1845, continually attempt to introduce a Bill to repeal the 
Corn Laws in their entirety.  His yearly attempts would fail to gather support from his own party, 
despite the praise he received from free trade groups like the ACLL. Still, Villiers and other 
ACLL members of Parliament became problematic for Peel and the Conservative party. Cries of 
“cheap bread” and “Free trade” became contentious slogans that Peel and his Conservative 
government had to face. Demands to address the Corn Laws from both the Laws’ supporters and 
opponents became a crucial item Peel had to address in the early days of his second ministry. 
Peel himself had carefully avoided the issue of the Corn Laws in the election of 1841. As The 
Illustrated London News would later put it, “He left himself many loopholes of escape from the 
charge of intentional tergiversation.”
155
 Peel’s delay over taking a personal position on the Corn 
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Law issue until after the election secured the much-needed support of the whole of the 
Conservative party. 
Thus as one of the most important subjects of the election of 1841, the Corn Laws 
became an immediate issue for Peel and his new ministry to address. Peel’s post-election 
discussion of the Corn Laws suggests that his intentions to reform the Corn Laws (not repeal 
them) had been part of his Conservative character since carefully dodging the issue in the 
election of 1841.  In a discussion before the new parliament, Peel stated that a reform of the 
sliding scale was necessary and a continuation of the Laws in their present form problematic. As 
he put it in the House,  
I will not bind myself to the details of the existing law, but will reserve to myself 
the unfettered discretion of considering and amending that law. I hold the same 
language now; but if you ask me whether I bind myself to the maintenance of the 
existing law in its details, or if you say that that is the condition on which the 




Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism is evident in this early discussion of the Corn Laws.  To Peel 
the Corn Laws were not a sine qua non of Conservativism; they could be modified or repealed 
entirely if that was in the best interest of the nation. His 1841 speech over the possibility of 
reforming the sliding scale took nothing off the table.  Peel advised his party and the nation that 
if the Corn Laws were not functioning as they were intended, reform or even repeal might be 
necessary. As he explained it in the summer of 1841,  
I would earnestly advise a relaxation, an alteration, nay, if necessary, a repeal of 
the Corn-laws. But it is because I cannot convince my mind that the Corn-laws 
are at the bottom of this distress, or that the repeal of them, or the alteration of 
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The suggestion that Peel made in this early Corn Law debate illustrated that he clearly saw 
himself as Prime Minister to a nation rather than Prime Minister to a Conservative government. 
The suggestion of total repeal in 1841, while overly alarming to the Tories, addressed his form of 
Conservativism as one that sought for the good of the nation through necessary reform.  He had 
to satisfy those that helped him into power but also those whom he believed would see his party 
into the future.  Any suggestion of a total repeal, in 1841, was risky and yet Peel left all options 
open.  
Suggestions from members of the Whig opposition to change or modify the Corn Laws 
had sparked outrage within Peel’s Conservative party. The MP William Mure retroactively saw 
Peel’s 1841 suggestion of a possible modification of the Corn Laws or even repeal as a sign that 
Peel had always intended to repeal them in their entirety.
 158
  His suggestion that if repeal should 
become necessary he would pursue it, became a point of tension with his own party. Peel 
therefore had to use caution when it came to proposing alterations to the Corn Laws.
159
  To the 
Tories that had helped him win the election only modification to the Corn Laws was acceptable, 
as it was what they had campaigned on, as opposed to the option of repeal. The election of 1841 
had been, after all, about modification, not repeal. However, some in Parliament argued that 
slight modifications to the existing Corn Laws were not a permanent solution to the problems 
they were causing in 1841. As Viscount Palmerston argued in a debate in late autumn of 1841, 









 Robert Peel’s Speech on Finance, October 6, 1841. Hansard, 3
rd




[It’s] the obligation on the part of the Government to prove and to declare to 
Parliament their determination on that great question— the Corn-laws, and on our 
whole commercial policy. He [Peel] would entreat them to consider this, 
persuaded as he was that the public would never be contented with the proposition 
to Parliament of some petty change in the "pivot," or some slight alteration of the 
"sliding scale;" and that even supposing the existing distress to subside, the 
country would not be satisfied with any measure short of one which would 
substantially, bonâ fide, permit the introduction of foreign corn at a moderate 
fixed duty.
160
   
Peel’s response to Palmerston was that his objective and that of his colleagues, was to maintain 
the institution of the Corn Laws and reform them to work.
161
 Many of the members of his 
government, who had helped him win office, were from rural constituencies, and wholeheartedly 
believed in the continuation of the Corn Law.
162
 Therefore Peel had to maintain a careful 
approach when it came to modifying the Corn Laws, since a large portion of his party had 
declared them a crucial institution of the state.  His response upon being prodded a second time 
within a few months of taking office was to abstain from any further comments. Peel had 
understood that if the Corn Laws were to be modified both reform and the approach to reform 
had to be careful.
 163
 If he was to maintain his position as Prime Minister as well as the stability 
of the nation he and his party would have to act carefully when it came to review of the Corn 
Laws.   
Peel’s eventual response was to propose a slight modification to the sliding scale. The 
changes to the Corn Laws in 1842 lowered the duty threshold for the free importation of grain 
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from the previous level of 72s per quarter to 51s per quarter.  These adjustments were designed 
to help lower the overall price of grain.  The new duty-free threshold of 51s per quarter had the 
desired effect as there was an almost immediate drop in the price of domestic grain. By the same 
token, in modifying the Corn Laws, Peel was actively maintaining the institution of 
protectionism. As his Tamworth Conservativism suggested, Peel was working within an existing 
system to make it work more efficiently rather than changing it fundamentally. This modification 
was, in his mind, preferable and more palatable to Parliament and his Conservatives than general 
repeal.
164
 Some historians have argued that by 1841 Peel’s modifications to the Corn Laws were 
actually steps towards free trade.  However, Peel’s modifications to the Corn Laws were strongly 
supported by the Protectionists who had campaigned on reform to the Corn Laws in the previous 
election.
165
 If it was true that Peel was slowly dismantling the Corn Laws in 1842, then it was 
also the case that he had the support of the Protectionists in this endeavor.  This theory that Peel 
was slowly dismantling the Corn Laws starting in 1842 doesn’t seem to have much validity.  
Peel’s motivation in 1842, like that of the Protectionists, was to reform the system to make it 
work more efficiently rather than to change it fundamentally.  
Additional modifications by Peel in 1843 opened Britain to the importation of Canadian 
corn at preferential rates. The expansion of the Canadian Corn Act was designed in part to 
provide relief to farmers in Upper Canada by granting a guaranteed market for Canadian grain 
growers.
166
 The passage of this Act in 1843 allowed Canadian grain to enter the British market at 
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a nominal duty and all flour manufactured in Canada at a proportionate rate. The Colonial 
secretary, Lord Stanley, who advocated for the Canadian Corn Bill, was met around the House 
with cheers when he observed that, “It is because the measure is purely a colonial measure, that 
as the Colonial Minister of the day, I now ask the House to grant Canada a boon… to which they 
have solicited for at least five and twenty years.”
167
 Stanley’s speech suggested that this 
expansion of the British market to include Canada was not a question of free trade or a critique 
of the Corn Laws but an expansion of national interests in colonial affairs.
168
  Additionally the 
Protectionists supported the Corn Bill of Canada as a way to secure closer ties within the empire. 
The expansion of the Corn Laws, to include Canadian grain at preferential rates, was both an 
attempt to strengthen ties within the empire and to help alleviate the higher price of domestic 
grain by reducing shipments from the American market.
169
  Conservative opposition to the Bill 
was minimal. The few Conservative opponents argued that American grain could pass into 
Canada and enter into Britain to avoid the higher importation duty.
170
 To these select few 
Protectionists the Canadian Corn Bill, as they saw it, was a slow transition towards a free trade 
system, rather than what Stanley called a boon to the famers of Canada.  However, most 
Conservatives accepted it because it was far from an abandonment of protection but rather an 
expansion of protectionism into the empire.
171
  
The Corn Law policy of 1842 and the Canadian Corn Bill of 1843 illustrated Peel’s 
Tamworth Conservativism in action.  In 1841, both he and protectionist Tories acknowledged 
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that an adjustment to the sliding scale was necessary.
172
  These reforms to an existing state 
institution followed Peel’s simple, but not simplistic, notion of Tamworth Conservativism, that is 
to say they were to preserve and guide the Corn Laws forward in the interests of Britain and the 
empire rather than simply repeal them. The Protectionist William Mure would argue in his 1847 
book The Commercial Policy of Pitt and Peel 1785-1846, that Peel’s modifications to the Corn 
Laws in 1842-43 were what Tory Protectionists had always feared, a move towards free trade.
173
 
However, these claims over Peel’s belief in free trade have been hotly contested. It is impossible 
to know if the modifications to the Corn Laws in 1842-3 were in fact designed to lead the nation 
towards free trade or were simply necessary reforms for national and imperial interest. While 
suspicions of Peel’s conversion to free trade have proliferated through the historiography, given 
the lack of any positive proof in Peel ‘s own words, it makes more sense to view the pursuit of 
necessary reforms by Peel as a logical extension of his Tamworth Conservativism.   
The rise of ACLL and Chartist agitation created a problem for Peel’s administration. For 
Peel the League, more so than the Chartists, was problematic, as members of the House clearly 
were being influenced by League propaganda. Lead by two great orators Richard Cobden (MP 
for Stockport since 1841) and John Bright (MP City of Durham) the League argued that the Corn 
Laws had outlived their usefulness and that free trade should become the national policy. With a 
foothold in the House and a successful national fundraising campaign the League applied 
significant pressure on the Peel government to repeal the Corn Laws.  Peel and the Conservatives 
had responded to these pressures with the modifications of the Corn Laws in 1842-3. Peel’s 1842 
modifications to the Corn Laws had slowed the League’s momentum and earned him more 
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middle class support, which the League had needed.
174
 Peel’s reforms to the Corn Laws arguably 
worked against League propaganda by illustrating that protectionism could work and that the 
Corn Laws had not outlived their usefulness. 
Additionally the Plug Plots of 1842 became a concern to the Peel government as it 
reacted to League agitation.  The Plug Plot Riots were alleged to be the result of a reduction of 
wages implemented by Anti-Corn Law manufacturers.
175
  As part of the larger General Strike of 
1842 the Plug Plot Riots started in the industrial centers of Britain and then became a national 
crisis.  Many workers took direct action by pulling out the plugs in the mill equipment to stop 
work altogether.  Most historians have argeed that the Plug Plots and the general strike of 1842 
were fueled by Chartist demands and the abysmal economic conditions of the working classes. A 
reduction of wages by the manufacturers, terrible living conditions, long working hours and little 
to no representation drove many of the working classes to riot.
176
 However, many Conservatives 
saw something else at work: an ACLL conspiracy to foment popular discontent in order to force 
the government’s hand on Corn Law repeal.  Graham, in a letter to Peel, argued that the 
manufacturers who supported the Anti-Corn Law League had intentionally pushed the working 
classes to their current level of desperation, through a reduction of wages, in order to force the 
government to consider repealing the Corn Laws.
177
 This theory has been difficult for historians 
to investigate.  Although Graham and other members of the Peel government saw a clear cut 
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connection between the League and the riots, most historians believe more was at work than 
ACLL manufacturers manipulating the working classes. Indeed, most historians argue that the 
strikers were not as concerned with the Corn Laws as Graham had believed, but rather sought a 
restoration of wages and more importantly the acceptance of the People’s Charter.
178
  Although 
Peel remained hesitant to send in the army against the strikers (perhaps to avoid another 
Peterloo) he eventually agreed with Wellington and called in the army to break up the strike.
179
 
After the general strike was ended, an investigation by the government could not determine 
beyond reasonable doubt that the League had had a hand in promoting the strikes or was 
connected to the general reduction of wages across the region. Peel, and to a greater extent, 
Graham were extremely dissatisfied with the local magistrates, and believed many of them 
(being ACLL members) were protecting those behind the agitation.
180
 
While the government’s official report stated that the riots were caused by Chartist 
agitation, both Peel and Graham believed that was false.  Certain as they were that the true cause 
of the riots was Anti-Corn Law League influence, both Graham and Peel demanded a more 
thorough investigation into the causes of the riots and the alleged links to the ACLL.
 181
 Peel 
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Those who believed Graham’s claim that the League was behind the riots, particularly the 
Protectionist Conservatives, became fearful about just how far the League was willing to go to 
force the government to repeal the Corn Laws.  The Protectionist wing of the party argued that 
an alliance between the working classes and the landlords against the factory owners would be 
an effective force to challenge the ACLL.  As a result, the growing strength of the League was 
countered early in 1843 by the emergence of a series of agricultural protection societies, most 
notably the Central Agricultural Protection Society (CAPS) under the leadership of the Duke of 
Richmond and the Duke of Buckingham.  Lead primarily by Richmond CAPS was a supposedly 
non-partisan organization dedicated to pressuring MP’s for the continuation of protection. Much 
like the ACLL this Anti-League organization worked as an external pressure group to convince 
the government – and the nation–that protection should be maintained.  While CAPS has been 
characterized by some historians as an organization of aristocratic landlords and economic 
ignoramuses who were out of touch with the latest developments in economic thought, the CAPS 
was far more sophisticated than this. The Protectionist members of the CAPS were actually well 
versed in the works of Adam Smith.  In fact, in the organization’s charter, Adam Smith’s defense 
of the necessity of Corn Laws to maintain the price of grain was one of the cornerstones in its 
defense of protection.
183
 Additionally, the CAPS challenged League propaganda that the Corn 
Laws were only continued because they supported the high rents of the Landlords.
184
  The 
society refuted these accusations by noting that many working class laborers and independent 
farmers relied on protectionism to maintain their wages.  They also argued that the calls for free 
trade benefited only the manufacturing interests.  Protectionists maintained, with some justice, 
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that while the manufacturing class did not have much in the way of international competition 
there was scarcely a country of Europe/North America that did not have some type of Corn 
Laws.
185
  CAPS concluded its argument about protectionism stating that a relaxation of 
protection might make goods cheap but asked did that cheapness have to be at the expense of the 
working classes?  
The Conservative party’s protection of working class interests, particularly after the Plug 
Plot Riots, became another key element of reform for Peel’s second government. The 1844 
Factory Act was designed to limit the working hours of children to nine hours and of women to 
no more than twelve.   
In a proposed amendment to the Factory Act Sir James Graham introduced a section 
aimed at further reducing the working hours of adolescents. Afterwards Lord Ashely had 
suggested replacing the words “twelve” with “Ten”.
186
 This aim at reducing the working hours 
for youths was the first serious attempt at instituting a ten hour workday.  Lord Ashely had 
received support from a large number of Conservatives and their rationale for support was split 
between humanitarian relief and Anti-League feelings. However, the amendment was defeated 
by seven votes and in a letter to the Queen, a frustrated Peel explained exactly how this issue had 
divided his party, 
A great body of the agricultural members, partly out of hostility to the Anti-Corn 
Law League, partly from the influence of humane feelings, not foreseeing the 
certain consequences as to the Corn Laws of new restrictions upon labour, voted 
against the government. It is difficult to foresee what may be the result of this 
question. Your Majesty's servants are in a minority, but they consider it would be 
                                                          
185
 Ibid., 23. 
 
186
 Lord Ashley’s Speech on Hours of Labour in Factories, March 19, 1844. Hansard, 3
rd
 Series, Vol. LXXIII § 




inconsistent with their public duty to sanction or acquiesce in the views of the 




Those who voted against Peel in this amendment to the Factory Act were in favor of a shortened 
workday, both to attack the source of the ACLL and out of human concern. Despite Lord 
Ashely’s attempt to reduce the working hours from twelve to ten hours with his amendment, the 
Factory Act did indeed pass with full support from the Peel government.  This division of the 
Conservative party over an amendment to a reform remains an interesting example of landed 
Tories pushing for more reform than Peel had envisioned. Peel and his government may have 
defeated the amendment to introduce a ten hour day but Peel’s reasoning behind his votes 
appears to be in line with his brand of Conservativism, that is to say Peel did not pursue the 
additional reform because it was not necessary at the moment.  Peel had argued that the previous 
reform of twelve hours had been the furthest reform that could be accepted by the factory owners 
and the government.  As he put it, “we have arrived at the utmost limit to which we can agree to 
limit the labour of adults”.
188
 In addition, Peel had recognized that a number of his fellow 
Conservatives had voted for Lord Ashley’s amendment solely because of their hostility to the 
ACLL and their friends and allies, the manufacturers.  The Russian ambassador, Baron Bunow, 
was present at the debate when the House rejected Lord Ashley’s amendment and his comments 
on Peel’s speech noted that; “It was impossible to speak with more reason, moderation, and 
strength.”
 189
 Peel’s address over the connection between the Corn Laws, and the regulation of 
factories earned him a round of applause.  Even after his failure to support a ten-hour day Lord 
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Ashely thanked Peel for his honesty and moderation when voting against the amendment. The 
limited regulation of factories appears as a successful application of Tamworth Conservativism 
in Peel’s administration in which some Conservatives sought to achieve reform beyond what 
Peel himself had determined was necessary.
190
   
To Peel the passage of the Factory Act proved that his party would willingly pursue 
reforms that it believed to be for the good of the nation. However, a number of his Conservative 
colleagues sought to go further and only voted on Lord Ashley’s ten hour amendment as a way 
to attack the ACLL.
191
  These traditional Tory members of the party would become a problem 
when pursuing other reforms that Peel deemed necessary for the good of the nation, and perhaps 
not coincidentally, for the good of Conservativism. The issue that would be the most damaging 
to Peel’s party (until his decision to repeal the Corn Laws) was the Maynooth Grant.  
Peel’s objective with the Maynooth Grant was to improve relations between Protestant 
England and Catholic Ireland by increasing the annual grant from the government to the Catholic 
seminary in Maynooth, Ireland.  Expanding Catholic influence in Ireland rather than protecting 
the Protestant church of Ireland infuriated many Tories within the Conservative party.  Anti-Irish 
and anti-Catholic sentiment flared up across the nation in response to Peel’s proposal to increase 
the grant. While it was often observed that the Church of England was the Tory party at prayer, 
this was no laughing matter for the Tories. The Royal College of St. Patrick at Maynooth was a 
Catholic seminary and since the Union of 1801 its grant had been controlled by London.  Peel’s 
Maynooth Bill proposed to raise the grant from its previous sum of under £10,000 to roughly 
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£30,000. Moreover, the grant was to become permanent.
192
 Many Tories found it doubly 
insulting that it was Peel, who had helped to pass Catholic emancipation in 1829, who was 
behind this pro-Catholic reform. What Peel had sought in the Maynooth Grant was an easing of 
the hostilities between Irish Catholics and the English Protestant church.
193
 Peel’s notion of 
necessary reform led him to believe that relaxing tensions in Ireland was essential – for the good 
of the Union– and that increasing the Maynooth Grant was a relatively low cost reform that 
could serve the larger interests of the nation. Others argued it was dangerous for a Protestant 
state to support a Catholic seminary, leading to fierce national debates over the future of 
Maynooth. Queen Victoria wrote about this political problem that had divided her government 
and was in shock at the ferocity of the opposition to Peel’s proposal: “I am sure poor Peel ought 
to be blessed by all Catholics for the manly and noble way in which he stands forth to protect 
and do good to poor Ireland.  RELIGIOUS BIGOTRY! But bigotry, wicked and blind passions it 
brings forth is quite dreadful, and I blush for Protestantism!
194
  The Queen’s reaction to the 
criticism that Peel received during the Maynooth controversy suggested that opposition on the 
grant was both a national problem in matters related to religion and an internal Conservative 
Party problem in relation to the extent of reform that could be tolerated by certain members of 
the party.  This controversy among Conservatives was caricatured in the satirical magazine 
Punch.  Situated between supporters and opponents, within his own party, Peel was compared to 
heroes in a Greek Tragedy.  The cartoon, titled The Position of The Premier, shows Peel in the 
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center, and flanked on either side by members of his own party, in both praise and disgust 
(Figure 1).
195
 Those on the left side of Peel (Wellington) have their hands raised and look up at 
the Prime Minister.  While those on the right (Disraeli) have their heads turned away, revolted by 
Peel’s expansion of the Maynooth Grant and his support of a Catholic institution.  
 
Figure 1. The Position of the Premier 
The cartoon illustrated the internal problems Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism was having by 
1845.  While many leading members of the party saw Peel as praiseworthy, the Tories 
increasingly saw him as an apostate of Tory social values. Peel’s own beliefs on the expansion of 
Maynnoth College were simple: for the long-term security of Protestant rule over Ireland 
concessions had to be made, an opinion he shared with many of his supporters despite Tory and 
public outcries. Still, no matter how carefully reasoned, the Maynooth Grant, like Peel’s 
acceptance of Catholic emancipation in 1829, made many Tories suspicious of his Conservative 
ideology.  
The public and press were also all too familiar with Peel’s changes of heart on major 
issues and had their suspicions even of his dedication to Protestantism. Once again, Peel was 
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attacked for his betrayal of Tory values and of the Protestant cause.
196
 Reactions to Peel’s 
changing politics were maliciously satirized in an 1845 edition of Punch: 
How wonderful is Peel 
He changeth with the Time, 
Turning and twisting like an eel 




Punch’s satire on Peel reflected the intense division over the issue of the Maynooth Grant. 
Comparing the Prime Minister to an eel moving through slime was an image many Tories 
already had of Peel. Still, despite the anger and feelings of betrayal towards Peel, the Maynooth 
Grant was passed. To many, the modifications of the Corn Laws in 1842 and 1843 were also 
indicative of Peel’s betrayal of “conservative” ideology. Speeches made by Peel hinted at 
modification or repeal of the Corn Laws and confirmed many Tory back-benchers suspicions 
that he was willing to betray what they viewed as fundamental conservative principles.
198
  The 
Tories had seen him betray their principles during the debate for Catholic emancipation in 1829 
and to them changes to the Corn Laws in 1842-3 were enough evidence to confirm suspicions 
that Peel was going to approach Corn Law reform again by the close of 1845.
199
 
The division on the Maynooth grant had been problematic for Peel and internal dissent 
over his leadership was becoming more vocal.
200
  While the Maynooth Grant had passed in the 
House of Commons (1845) it drastically weakened Peel’s government and his ability to lead a 
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unified Conservative party.  The internal Conservative problems after the passage of the 
Maynooth Grant began to bring elements of Conservative division into center stage.  This 
reflected the underlying flaw of Peel’s second ministry, the lack of party unity. Peel had 
successfully returned as Prime Minister in 1841 with Tory votes, but his reforms starting with the 
expansion of the Maynooth Grant were perceived as an apostasy of Tory social values instead of 
necessary reform for the good of the nation. 
After the passage of the Maynooth Grant, Peel’s government became more involved with 
the Corn Laws.  The attacks by the ACLL had increased dramatically since 1841 and debates 
over the free-trade nature of Britain were infecting every branch of the political sphere. In 
correspondence between Peel and Croker, Peel suggested that coming debates over the Corn 
Laws must, at the very least, be centered around the continued maintenance of the nation’s 
commercial prosperity.
201
 While Peel had not yet decided to repeal the Corn Laws in August 
1845, he knew that the next time the Corn Laws were up for review, the idea of repeal would be 
forced into the debate by the ACLL’s national campaign.
202
  
 In October of 1845, with news of the potato blight in Ireland, the ACLL changed its usual 
approach and began pressuring the government to repeal the Corn Laws as a form of 
humanitarian relief.
203
  This placed Peel in a difficult position.  By autumn 1845 the League had 
organized a massive national movement to repeal the Corn Laws and endorse free trade.  While 
Anti-League organizations had been founded many of those behind these organizations, such as 
the CAPS, did little to pressure Peel for a continuation of protectionism out of fear of breaking 
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 The CAPS organization, unlike the ACLL, had refused to act in elections and 
purchase freeholds and by December of 1845 could do little to expand its influence beyond the 
already converted.  Additionally, with news of the potato famine in Ireland worsening daily, the 
League had the perfect political ammunition against any hopes Peel might have had to maintain 
the Corn Laws. The famine in Ireland allowed the League to launch a new and popular national 
campaign, both for total repeal of the Corn Laws and humanitarian relief in Ireland.
205
 With the 
non-voting public undoubtedly on the side of the League, by late autumn 1845 Peel had to make 
a choice; repeal the Corn Laws and alienate many of his own party supporters or face a national 
crisis.
206
 Historians have long debated Peel’s decision to undertake total repeal of the Corn Laws, 
but if one considers the key principle of his personal brand of Conservativism, that reforms 
which he believed to be absolutely necessary to the preservation of the state must be undertaken 
in a proactive fashion, – Peel was actually being quite consistent in his decision to pursue total 
repeal of the Corn Laws.  
The fight to repeal the Corn Laws starting in late autumn of 1845 placed Peel and the 
majority of his party at odds.  Peel was now convinced that repeal was a necessary reform and 
had to convince his party to pass a total repeal of the Corn Laws. Peel’s ultimate reasoning 
behind repeal, rather than a temporary suspension, was that repeal was the necessary reform 
required to preserve the other institutions of the state, that is to say the Church and the 
aristocracy.   Peel’s handling of the Corn Laws through careful reform in 1842-3 had passed his 
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party with relative ease and he had believed those reforms had worked.
207
 However, he knew that 
pursuing a total repeal in late 1845 was likely to break his ministry and possibly his party.
208
 Peel 
had a history of changing positions (in his own mind always for the greater good) on reforms that 
he deemed to be necessary.  Peel’s changing position on the Corn Laws by 1845 was observed 
by many Tory backbenchers as nothing more than the result of pressure exerted on the Prime 
minister from the ACLL.  In the famous carton published by Punch Peel is depicted as a small 
child led on a free trade walk by ACLL founder Richard Cobden.
 209
 This kind of imagery 
illustrated to both the public and the Tories that Peel was being led by the ACLL pressures into 
repealing the Corn Laws rather than by his own agenda. Tory backbenchers had argued that it 
was Peel, not the opposition, who had chipped away at the Corn Laws enough to cause them to 
become unenforceable and to force repeal.
210
 Historians have debated whether or not this 
accusation was true. For his part, Peel would later state that repeal at that moment was a 




Corn Law Repeal and Conservative Crisis 
In any event, by early August of 1845 Peel’s Conservative government had clearly begun 
to divide over the issue of the Corn Laws.  Peel himself had been ambiguous before on the issue 
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of the Corn Laws but pressure to repeal the Corn Laws from the public began to overtake his 
commitment to his party’s position.  His decision to repeal the Corn Laws, like his earlier 
decision to support Catholic emancipation, was a process in the making. Announcing that he 
would seek total repeal of the Corn Laws in October of 1845 Peel was subject to a massive 
backlash from the Protectionist wing of his own party. Because Parliament was not then in 
session – having been in recess since August– Peel remained in power.  As Charles Greville 
stated before Peel publicly announced his decision on the Corn Laws, the Whigs could not 
challenge him and although the Tories despised him they could not publicly oppose him.
212
 
Peel’s official address to Parliament, when that body reconvened in December, calling for a total 
repeal of the Corn Laws was met with opposition all around the House.
213
  Nevertheless, it was 
the members of the Conservative party that reacted the most negatively to Peel’s decision to 
repeal the Corn Laws.   
A few years earlier, the Conservatives had willingly supported his changes to the Corn 
Laws and saw those changes as conserving the institution of protectionism. As previously stated, 
the Protectionist faction of the Conservative party had already organized a society to counter the 
ACLL and to help convince the government to maintain protectionism. The formation of the 
CAPS in 1843 to counter the League’s influence over Parliament had also increased the tensions 
over the Corn Laws.
214
 While the Duke of Richmond’s society was supposed to be non-partisan 
the bulk of the CAPS membership consisted of Tory Protectionists who did not like the direction 
Peel seemed to be taking the party. Peel had remained silent on the issue of protectionism in 
                                                          
212
 Charles Greville August 21, 1845. The Greville Memoirs: A Journal of the Reign Queen Victoria from 1837 to 
1852 By the Late Charles C.F. Greville Vol. II.  ed. Henry Reeve. (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1885), 290. 
 
213
 Charles Greville December 5, 1845. The Greville Memoirs Vol. II. ed. Henry Reeve 310.  
 
214
 Edward Stillingfleet Cayley Esq., MP. Reasons for the Formation of the Agricultural Protection Society 




1841 and his subsequent modifications to the Corn Laws in 1842-3 had created suspicion. While 
he had received Protectionist support for his reforms his announcement to repeal the Corn Laws 
was met with overt hostility.  Peel’s decision to work towards repeal marked the beginning of a 
truly profound Conservative political fragmentation in both Houses of Parliament.
215
  The 
fracturing of the Conservative party over the Corn Laws turned the electoral victory Peel had 
achieved in 1841 into a tragedy.  
The greatest obstacle in maintaining Peel’s leadership of the Conservative party was the 
Tory backbench. These traditional Tory Conservatries were the most vocal opponents of Peel’s 
decision to repeal the Corn Laws. Peel’s support for the expansion of the Maynooth Grant had 
been a point of tension with the backbenchers, but in their minds his decision to repeal the Corn 
Laws was outright treasonous and they could no longer follow him. Protectionist disgust in 1845 
began to mount and the divisions between the Protectionists and those remaining loyal to Peel 
became more overt.  Long pent up anger from the backbenchers directed at Peel, became 
problematic for the continued unity of the government.  Peel’s Conservative supporters knew a 
backbench revolt would be disastrous. As Sir James Graham had foreseen, the Protectionists 
were going to be problematic for Conservative unity if repeal of the Corn Laws was going to be 
discussed.  Months before the potato famine had started Graham had noted, rather presciently 
that, “The time will come when this party [Protectionists] will bitterly deplore the fall of Sir 
Robert Peel, and when in vain they will wish that they had not overthrown a Government, which 
its enemies could not vanquish, but which its supporters abandoned and undermined.”
216
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With news of the potato blight in Ireland in October of 1845 Robert Peel undertook the 
difficult decision to work towards total repeal.  Writing to Graham, Peel noticed that the reports 
from Ireland indicated that up to a third or even half of the potato crop was lost due to blight. 
This to Peel was very alarming.
217
  Suggestions to suspend the Corn Laws to provide immediate 
short-term relief were made but pressure from the ACLL and worries about insurrections in the 
North of England made this goal impractical.  Historians have often wondered why Peel felt 
compelled to pursue total repeal rather than short term suspension.   Whatever the ultimate 
rationale for his decision, be it as a form of humanitarianism, or more likely a desire to offer 
proactive (instead of reactionary) reform designed to prevent a larger crisis in England and 
Ireland, by November of 1845 Peel was committed to total repeal. Correspondence with 
Wellington, Goulburn and Graham in late October and early-November of 1845 proved that Peel 
was determined to affect a total and immediate repeal of the Corn Laws.
218
  On November 3, 
1845, Peel received a letter from Stanley expressing his difference of opinion regarding the 
necessity of total repeal of the Corn Laws.  Stanley wrote that “I have reflected much and 
anxiously upon it; but I cannot bring my mind to any other conclusion.”
219
 Stanley’s argument 
was that the Prime Minister’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws had been undertaken without 
careful review and if he were to continue on this path Stanley would oppose him on this measure.  
As the battle lines were drawn at the close of the year, Peel began to lose the support of 
the majority of his party. In the December 13
th
, 1845 edition of Punch magazine, a poem titled 
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New Sennacherib summed up the situation rather neatly: ”Sir Robert came down so bold, and his 
backers felt savage and sorry and sold.”
220
Peel’s bold decision to repeal the Corn Laws in early 
winter had effectively caused a rift in his party.  The Protectionists who had pledged their 
support to him in 1841 now felt betrayed as Peel decided to pursue total repeal of the Corn Laws. 
However, as Peel had argued in 1841 he did not seek the approval of the Protectionists, his 
decisions on the Corn Laws or any other necessary reform were tied to his belief that he must act 
for the good of the nation.
 221
  Peel’s decision to seek total repeal sparked vocal opposition from 
within his party.  Those who spoke out against Peel included Benjamin Disraeli, Lord George 
Bentinck, the Duke of Richmond, and Lord Stanley.
222
  These opponents of Peel’s decision 
argued that repeal was both a poor decision and a wrong national policy. Attack from the 
Protectionists starting in the winter of 1845 marked the beginning of the decline of Peel’s 
leadership of the Conservative party.  Indeed, the collapse of Peel’s Conservative government 
was now virtually inevitable.  
Peel’s insistence on total repeal was ill received by a majority of his party. As a result the 
Prime Minister took the unusual step of suggesting that he and his government should resign and 
that the opposition should try to form a government. In an interview with the Queen it was 
agreed that John Russell should be asked to attempt to form a government.
223
  Peel wrote to his 
wife expressing concern and worry about the future of a Conservative government in the days 
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 He was concerned about the ability of Russell to form a ministry but was 
convinced that the actions he had taken in order to work towards repeal of the Corn Laws were 
absolutely justified: “Not only have I acted with the best intentions but firmly believe that which 
I have done is the best that under the circumstances could have been done.”
225
  Peel knew that if 
Russell were to form a government the Conservative party would split before the Corn Laws 
could be successfully repealed.  Peel believed that even if Russell could form a (minority) 
government Russell could not hope to repeal the Corn Laws alone, that task would still have to 
fall on Peel.
226
 Rumors that Russell had succeeded in forming a minority government on the 18
th
 
of December had Peel on edge.
227
 However, such rumors were without foundation and Russell 
failed to gather support sufficient to form a government. Thus, Peel remained the Prime Minister 
and, even with a majority of his party opposed to him he made it irrevocably clear on the 23
rd
 of 
December 1845 that upon his return to the House after the Christmas break, he would make it his 
objective to repeal the Corn Laws in their entirety.
228
  His return to the House in January was 
marked with the strong division in the Conservative party; his intentions to repeal the Corn Laws 
left the majority of the party opposed to his leadership.   
Interestingly enough, Peel’s unseating would come not at the hands of the old line Tories 
but from a newly developing type of Conservative. Lord George Bentinck, Lord Stanley, and 
Benjamin Disraeli would become representatives of the new Conservative Tories. Each of these 
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Conservatives had been suspicious of Peel after his stance on the Maynooth Grant and to them 
the decision to repeal the Corn Laws was proof of his complete betrayal of Conservative 
ideology.  Their fundamental opposition to Peel concerned his over extension of reform. By 
pressing for a total repeal of the Corn Laws many Protectionist Conservatives thought that, just 
as it the case of the Maynooth Grant and Catholic emancipation, Peel was disregarding important 
institutions of the state; one of Conservativism’s founding principles.  The most vocal of these 
Conservative rebels in the spring of 1846 was Benjamin Disraeli.
229
  
 An early admirer of Robert Peel’s political genius, Benjamin Disraeli had eventually 
become critical of Peel’s Conservative idea as lacking a central doctrine.  The young politician 
had initially joined Peel as a vocal opponent of the Whigs while his Jewish family background 
had been something that had prevented him from aligning with the most reactionary of Tories.
230
 
This had left Disraeli as a unique kind of Tory Conservative.
231
 While he wanted to be among the 
ranks of the elite he often found himself ridiculed because of his Jewish background. Disraeli 
began his political career for the constituency of Maidstone in 1837.  However, the expenses of 
that seat were too much for the debt ridden young Disraeli.  By 1841, he secured the 
Conservative nomination for Shrewsbury. In addressing a crowd at his new constituency of 
Shrewsbury, members of the audience brought bits of pork on a stick and taunted him by 
shouting ‘Bring a bit of Pork for the Jew’.
232
 This kind of ridicule followed Disraeli his entire life 
and was not limited to the lower orders of society. Mistrust and taunts because of his Jewish 
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background forced the young Disraeli to work much harder to earn respect from his colleagues 
and sponsors.  
In Disraeli’s attempts to distance himself from his Jewish background he sought 
acceptance by the aristocratic class through his writings and dress. Known for his foppish 
appearance the young Disraeli would wear a flowery vest and was always concerned with his 
appearance. As a novelist, he was often critiqued as an outsider looking into the world of the 
aristocracy through a lens that gave him a romanticized view of the country’s most privileged 
class.
233
 It was through these writings that Disraeli attempted to outline the ideology of the 
modern Tory or Conservative. 
234
 His writings would provide one of the most telling critiques of 
Peel’s Conservativism and policies since 1834.  
 Disraeli’s political novels had attempted to identify in words what it meant to be 
Conservative and what Conservative principles were supposed to be.  An element he often 
addressed in his works was the positive role of the aristocracy both in Conservativism and in 
British life.  His works combined a mix of politics and ethics illustrating how he perceived the 
development of government and political parties after the Reform Bill. Disraeli, like many other 
Conservatives, questioned Peel’s post-Reform Bill idea of Conservativism. Disraeli’s core 
critique was that Peel’s Conservativism lacked serious principles and his criticism manifested 
itself in his writings. In his two most famous political novels, Coningsby or the New Generation 
and Sybil or the Two Nations, Disraeli questioned the Conservativism that Peel had created and 
argued that Conservativism should stand for a strong set of principles and values founded in 
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 Disraeli, unlike his contemporary the novelist Charles Dickens’, argued that the 
working classes should be led by an enlightened aristocracy. Disraeli’s political novels, 
published respectively in 1844 and 1845 offered a critique of the direction of Conservativism 
under Peel.  He argued that Robert Peel’s Conservativism had failed to act on behalf of all 
classes. In Sybil Disraeli proposed the idea that Conservativism should be representative of the 
nation regardless of class identification. His notion of what would later be called one-nation 
Conservativism was a critique of the ‘two nations’ (and Peel’s Conservativism) that were 
developing in industrial Britain. Sybil traced the plight of the working classes of England and 
argued that the aristocracy should take the initiative to protect the poor, leading many critics to 
note that Sybil – and therefore Disraeli – advocated a return to a very medieval and paternalistic 
relationship between the classes.
236
  The work also indicated Disraeli’s personal sympathies for 
the Chartist movement; however, the main focus of the novel was the growing division of the 
country because of industrialization. Disraeli argued that both the people and politics of Great 
Britain had begun to divide into ‘two nations’.  Disraeli outlined this problem through his 
characters’ dialog, 
Two nations between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are 
ignorant of each other’s habits, thoughts, and feelings, as if they were dwellers in 
different zones or inhabitants of different planets; who are formed by a different 
breeding, are fed by different food, are opened by different manners, and are not 
governed by the same laws’. 
You speak of- ‘said Egremont hesitantly. ‘The rich and poor.’
237
 
Disraeli had believed that Conservativism for one nation across all classes would keep and 
maintain the important institutions of the state.  Disraeli argued that by creating ‘two nations’ 
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and ignoring the negative changes associated with industrialization, the suffering of the working 
classes at the hands of the manufacturers would only increase.  Conservativism, Disraeli argued, 
needed to be more than a veneer over old Toryism; it had to evolve from it to address the needs 
of the people of England.  Additionally, its origins in Toryism were an essential embodiment of a 
national identity.
238
 Toryism, and Conservativism, Disraeli argued had the responsibility to the 
nation to lead and to preserve it.
239
 Therefore to prevent the division of classes, Disraeli argued 
Conservativism needed to have real substance, Conservativism had to be paternalistic.  
His change of heart concerning Peel’s Conservativism was also in part an act of 
vengeance against his idol for failing to recognize his genius. By 1841, Disraeli had, in his own 
opinion, been the most loyal and supportive follower of Peel (since his election to office in 1837) 
and felt that at the age of 37 he was ready for a cabinet position in Peel’s new Conservative 
Ministry.
240
 A whole group of men younger than him, including Gladstone, Dalhousie, Lincoln, 
and Cardwell were all given office.  As each office was announced and filled Disraeli had felt 
increasingly abandoned and brushed aside despite his loyalty to Peel. To Disraeli these men 
represented the very best of the upper class English political crop and to be excluded devastated 
him.
241
  In September of 1841 Disraeli wrote to Peel out of desperation, wanting to know why he 
was passed over in cabinet appointments,   
I confess to be unrecognized at this moment by you appears to me to be 
overwhelming; and I appeal to your own heart to that justice and that 
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magnanimity, which I feel are your characteristics to save me from an intolerable 
humiliation- Believe me, dear Sir Robert
242
 
Peel had little choice in the matter of denying the young politician, with virtually no experience, 
a position in the cabinet.  Although Disraeli had proved ambitious and skillful, Peel did not see 
Disraeli as suitable for a cabinet position.  His lack of experience and record gave Peel no choice 
in the matter of passing over the young Conservative.
243
 Peel never wrote a reply to Disraeli who 
in turn, never forgot Peel’s lack of respect. The letter Disraeli wrote to Peel would become a 
point of contention down the road between the two men. Disraeli’s petition for office was 
perhaps in part because he was overconfident in his own talents but more so because it was a 
position that came with a salary.  Regular MP’s were often unpaid and Disraeli’s earlier failures 
in finance meant that he had acquired massive debts.  Disraeli’s desire for office was twofold; he 
was a man of immense ambition but he had also amassed huge debts. His debts, accounting to 
roughly ₤30,000 (approx. ₤1.2 million in present values) were always a burden upon him despite 
his marriage to a wealthy widow in 1839.
244
 He felt that a paid position could help soften the 
burden of his debts as well as expand his political career. The debts from Disraeli’s failures in 
finance and his extravagant lifestyle would not fully be paid off until 1849.
245
 
Disraeli’s negative opinion of Peel and of his ‘reforms’ had a history which predated the 
Prime Minister’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws. He saw Peel as early March of 1845 as a man 
who would possibly modify the state institutions (especially the church) out of existence if such 
reforms kept him in power. Peel, in Disraeli’s mind, was an agent supporting the ever increasing 
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division of the nation by appeasing the Whigs through excessive and damaging reforms. His 
disgust with Peel became heated after a discussion concerning agricultural interests and the Corn 
Laws in March of 1845.  Disraeli argued that Peel ought to resign over the matter, “Dissolve, if 
you please, the Parliament you have betrayed, and appeal to the people, who, I believe, mistrust 
you. For me there remains this at least—the opportunity of expressing thus publicly my belief 
that a Conservative Government is an organised hypocrisy.”
246
 The effect produced in the House 
by calling the Prime Minister’s government ‘an organised hypocrisy’ created a considerable 
uproar.  Disraeli’s comments, as he would later write, received a silent nod of approval from 
some Backbench Tories.  As he put it “the Tory gentlemen beneath the gangway who swelled the 
chorus did so with downcast eyes, as if they yet hesitated to give utterance to feelings too long 
and too painfully suppressed.”
247
  Disraeli’s speech in March of 1845 and his perceived 
acknowledgment by backbench Tories began in his mind a Conservative opposition to Peel’s 
reforms and leadership.  Disraeli would go on to oppose Peel even more vocally following the 
increase of the Maynooth Grant and by December of 1845 Disraeli would lead a backbench 
revolt against the Prime Minister’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws. 
Disraeli’s support of the Corn Laws was not bound by his belief in some antiquated 
economic policy but rather from their symbolic importance. Disraeli had linked the Corn Laws to 
the maintenance of the landed aristocracy and the structure it provided for a stable society. 
Therefore, it was part of his argument that Peel’s movement against the Corn Laws was a 
betrayal of traditional institutions and their conservation.
248
 Disraeli’s own opinions were made 
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clear as early as 1843 in an address to his constituents at Shrewsbury, a point he would reiterate 
again in December of 1845.  He stated that “ I will not pledge myself to miserable questions of 
6d. in 7s. 6d or 8s. of duties about corn… but what I want and what I wish to secure…is the 
preponderance of the landed interest.”
249
Disraeli’s statement about the Corn Laws suggested that 
he like other Protectionist supporters were not as concerned with the amounts of money 
generated by the tariff or the need for protection as for the position of the landed class in the 
state.  The removal of the Corn Laws not only represented the takeover of economic policy by 
the new middle classes but an abandonment of the traditional class in the management of the 
economy and the nation. Disraeli attacked Peel’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws as a betrayal 
of Conservative/Tory values.   
Of course, Disraeli was not the only Conservative who questioned Peel’s Conservativism.  
The one who came to be the most vocal in the context of the Corn Law crisis was Lord George 
Bentinck.  His alliance with Benjamin Disraeli instigated a rebellion against the Prime Minister 
from the backbenches, which brought down Peel’s Conservative leadership. As the Member of 
Parliament for the borough of King’s Lynn
250
 Bentinck began his political career as a Whig but 
fell into the New Conservative party of Robert Peel with other supporters of Lord Stanley.  
Bentinck was a model old-line politician but in no sense of the word a Tory. He had crossed the 
floor of the Commons from the Whigs in 1835 with Lord Stanley to join Peel’s new 
Conservative party.  As the epitome of a landed gentleman, Lord George Bentinck treated the 
Commons more like a gentleman’s club than a house of government.
251
 Bentinck himself had 
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rarely spoken in the House and was often absent until the Corn Law crisis; a crisis, which in his 
opinion, reflected the very problem of a Conservative ideology.  When Peel announced his 
decision to repeal the Corn Laws Bentinck began to attack the polices of the Prime Minister.  
Lord Bentinck was perhaps the perfect example of the protectionist branch in the 
Conservative party.  His efforts to maintain the Corn Laws were based on his beliefs in the 
Protectionist cause but more so upon his beliefs concerning the aristocratic role of the landed 
elites within the constitution. Like Disraeli, he did not see the Corn Laws as a superior economic 
system; he saw them as a crucial link to the aristocracy’s role in government. Additionally like 
many other Protectionists, Bentinck was much more inclined to support a system that had 
worked historically. Repeal would result in the retreat of aristocratic power from the economic 
development of the country. This explains why a country gentlemen, jockey, and aristocrat, who 




In Disraeli’s biography of Bentinck, he observed his friend to be one of the strongest 
supporters of Robert Peel.  He argued that until the Corn Law crisis; “[h]is trust in that minster 
was indeed absolute.”
253
 While Bentinck had reluctantly supported Peel’s policy over the 
Maynooth Grant he grew suspicious of Peel’s actions towards state institutions, especially his 
attitude towards the Corn Laws.  When Peel announced his decision to repeal the Corn Laws in 
their entirety Bentinck was outraged.  He believed that Peel had betrayed the Conservative 
values he had advocated in the election of 1841.
254
 Disraeli argued in his book, Lord George 
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Bentinck: A Political Biography that until the Corn Law crisis Bentinck, like other 
Conservatives, had been satisfied with Peel’s leadership.  However, after Peel’s decision to 
repeal the Corn Laws became known Bentinck lost all faith in Peel’s ability to act as a 
Conservative leader.  Instead Bentick and the other Protectionists saw him as someone who was 
willing to retreat on “Conservative” issues in order to gain public approval. 
Bentinck flew in the face of the Conservative establishment and argued that Peel had 
abandoned the Conservative triumph of 1841 and the sentiments of his own party in favor of 
taking an un-conservative direction.
255
 Disraeli argued that men like Bentinck soon represented 
the majority within the Conservative party. Disraeli wrote that, 
[I]f it could shown to the country, that the great bulk of the Conservative party 
were true to their faith, and were not afraid, even against the fearful odds which 
they would have to encounter, to proclaim it, the confidence and the courage of 
the country would rally, and the party in the House of Commons would find 




While men like Disraeli and Bentinck held optimistic views that their cause would gather support 
Peel on the other hand argued against their cause. Peel’s rebuttal was that these Conservative 
backbenchers were selfish and refused to think of the greater good.
257
 In reply, Bentinck argued 
that his Tory rebellion was doing its “fair share of the government for the country.”
258
However, 
Bentinck’s vocal attacks on Peel were more often than not counterproductive to the debate.  
Bentinck’s ruthlessness, single-mindedness and determination, coupled with the anger and 
ferocity with which he attacked Peel, gained the once silent member from Kings Lynn notoriety 
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among the backbenchers. Bentinck became even more vocal concerning the widespread imperial 
effects of repeal.  
As a staunch Protectionist, Bentinck had believed in the maintenance of the Corn Laws 
for both national and colonial security. While Bentinck was not a highly skilled orator he was 
well versed in the facts and figures behind the free trade debate.
259
 His argument, much like 
Disraeli’s, was that repeal of the Corn Laws was not so much about the pricing of grain but the 
fundamental change of the institution of empire. He argued that repeal was not only a mistake 
but an outright betrayal of the Canadian colonies.
260
 During the debates to repeal the Corn Laws 
Bentinck stressed what he believed was an abandonment of the colonies to the uncertainty of the 
market. During the third reading of the bill to repeal the Corn Laws in May of 1846 Bentinck 
argued, 
It was only in 1843 the Canada Corn Bill was passed, which was held to be a 
compromise—almost a bargain—with our Canadian Colonies, …The Canadas 
were then led to believe that that was a permanent measure; but three years had 
not elapsed before all the capital which had been vested on the faith of that 




Bentinck and other Conservatives saw total repeal as an abandonment of that other core 
institution of Conservativism, the Empire. A total repeal of the Corn Laws would, in Bentinck’s 
mind, be tantamount to the economic abandonment of British North America, which less than 
three years prior had been granted special treatment.
262
  Bentinck and other backbench rebels in 
                                                          
259
Disraeli, Lord George Bentinck, 7. 
 
260
 Gambles, Protection and Politics, 199. 
 
261
 Lord George Bentinck’s Speech on the Total and Immediate Repeal of the Corn Laws, May 14, 1846. 
Hansard,3rd Series. Vol. LXXXIV § §553-76 § 554. 
 
262




1846 now argued that Peel’s pervious modifications to the Corn Laws in 1842-3 were clear 
indications that Peel was moving the nation towards free trade.
263
  While this accusation against 
Peel appears to illustrate his slow movement towards free trade, in reality Peel’s modifications in 
1842-3 were designed to work within the system to make it more efficient rather than 
fundamentally change it.   
The bold attacks on Peel from the vocal partnership of Disraeli and Bentinck fueled the 
backbencher revolt as more Conservatives joined the Protectionist cause to uphold the Corn 
Laws. This partnership between Bentinck and Disraeli was derisively known by many, as the 
“Jockey and the Jew”.
264
  Bentinck’s partnership with Disraeli gave political strength to the 
young Disraeli and defeated suspicions that he was nothing but a disgruntled upstart who didn’t 
know his proper place in the party.
265
  These two Protectionists began to organize an internal 
Protectionist party of sorts within Peel’s Conservative ministry.  
Their backbench revolt had expressed legitimate arguments concerning the question of 
the Corn Laws.  Repeal would mean an abandonment of empire, a further lessening of the 
aristocracy’s power, and the collapse of a time tested economic system.  Although Bentinck was 
regarded as crass, his partnership with Disraeli made up for his often weakly driven speeches and 
un-parliamentary attacks on Peel. Their joint actions in early 1846 increased the strength of the 
backbench revolt insuring that if Peel succeeded in repealing the Corn Laws, it would be a 
Pyrrhic victory, as it would certainly cost him the Premiership.  
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 While Disraeli and Bentinck emerged as the figureheads of the protectionist revolt in the 
House of Commons it would be a different Conservative that took the leadership of the 
Protectionists after they decided to split with Peel. Lord Stanley, who had joined Peel’s 
Conservative party after his own Derby Dilly party collapsed, would emerge as the new leader.  
His support for Peel, like Bentinck’s, remained constant until the decision to repeal the Corn 
Laws.
266
  Stanley had supported Peel even with the Maynooth Grant but Peel’s decision to repeal 
the Corn Laws was more than he could tolerate.
267
  The developing Corn Law crisis reshaped 
how Stanley saw Peel and the future of the Conservative party.  While no longer a member of the 
House of Commons at the time of the Corn Law Crisis, (he had been elevated to the Lords in 
1844) Lord Stanley remained the most cautious supporter of the protectionist rebellion. 
Stanley’s elevation to the House of Lords in 1844 was met with unease by Peel.  In 
correspondence with Wellington, Peel indicated that the loss of Stanley in the Commons was 
going to be difficult but the Duke assured Peel that Stanley would support his cause in the upper 
chamber.
268
 From his position in the House of Lords, Stanley was pressured by Bentinck to 
oppose Peel’s plan for total Corn Law repeal.
269
  However, this was not the route Stanley took, 
he instead listened to Bentinck and agreed with him concerning the role of the Corn Laws but 
refused to use the House of Lords to oppose the Prime Minister.
270
  It was Stanley’s objective to 
maintain and preserve the Conservative party in order to prevent the radical Whigs from entering 
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government. Creating a Protectionist rebellion in the House of Lords would have damaged the 
Conservative party in his opinion beyond repair. Thus, although siding with Disraeli and 
Bentinck privately, Stanley would not openly attack Peel’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws 
until Parliament resumed in early 1846.  His criticism of the abolition of the Corn Laws became 
clear only when Peel announced it was his government’s plan to repeal them to provide relief for 
Ireland.
271
   
Unlike Disraeli and Bentinck, Stanley did not see the Protectionist revolt at first as an 
open rebellion against Peel, but rather as an issue of internal Conservative dissent. He also 
refused to rally the ‘country gentlemen’ together to oppose Peel but soon realized the Corn Laws 
were going to break the party regardless of his involvement.
272
 Stanley knew that a firm break 
with Peel would not only give the Whigs political power but would also deprive Conservative 
forces of office for the foreseeable future due to internal division. However, the deep 
protectionist roots within the Conservative party shifted the internal disagreement over 
protectionism into solid division.  Disraeli and Bentinck’s rebellion had, by late 1845, 
successfully ruptured the Conservative Party and taken the bulk of its members away from Peel’s 
control.  Their division of the Conservative party by the end of December 1845 had brought Peel 
to the point of resignation. However, John Russell’s failed attempt to form a minority 
government meant that when Parliament resumed in January Peel would be back at the frontlines 
attempting to repeal the Corn Laws. Disraeli and Bentinck’s forces would now launch an all-out 
assault on Peel in order to prevent him from passing repeal in the Commons. 
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By January of 1846, it was clear that repeal of the Corn Laws would devastate the unity 
of the Conservative party.  Russell’s failed attempt to form a government meant that Peel had to 
repeal the Corn Laws alone. The Duke of Wellington wrote in early January that even he did not 
know the intentions of Robert Peel when it came to the Corn Laws.
273
 However, he also stated 
that whatever the course Peel had decided upon, he, the Duke of Wellington, would support him. 
The division between the Protectionists in the House and those still loyal to Peel was going to 
split on a final vote for Corn Law repeal or perhaps even before then.  While Disraeli and 
Bentinck  professed outrage at Peel and his supporters for their apostasy, Stanley remained level 
headed and wanted to mitigate the damage and look for a way to reunite the factions before an 
impasse was created dividing ‘conservatives’ again.
274
 For his part Bentinck would not consider 
compromise or a reunification.  In his opinion, Peel’s apostasy had been final and his objective 
now was to prevent Peel and his allies from passing repeal before the next election.
275
 
The final blows came in late April 1846, as both Disraeli and Bentinck ramped up their 
attacks against Peel. It was their intention to prevent Peel from repealing the Corn Laws by any 
means possible. Bentinck’s fierce attacks on Peel made it clear that division of the Conservative 
party and the humiliation of Sir Robert Peel was the only acceptable avenue of victory for the 
Protectionists.
276
  Disraeli’s eloquent attacks on Peel stressed that Peel had undeniably betrayed 
Conservative values and side stepped the decision of the electorate in 1841 in favor of Whig and 
Anti-Corn Law League appeasement. In early May of 1846 the division of the Conservative 
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party was finalized with a vote of total repeal in the House of Commons.  For his final assault on 
Peel, Disraeli offered the most scathing and destructive verbal attack on the man he had once 
idolized.   His speech against the Prime Minister on May 15th 1846 was a culmination of both 
his hatred of Peel, his belief in the protectionist cause and the fiery rhetoric he had mastered as a 
writer.  Disraeli’s infamous speech fired every personal attack imaginable at Peel and his 
supporters.  Disraeli characterized them as, 
…political peddlers that bought their party in the cheapest market, and sold us in 
the dearest. I know, Sir, that there are many who believe that the time  is gone by 
when one can appeal to those high and honest impulses that were once the 
mainstay and the main element of the English character. I know, Sir, that we 
appeal to a people debauched by public gambling, stimulated and encouraged by 
an inefficient and shortsighted Minister. I know that the public mind is polluted 
with economic fancies; a depraved desire that the rich may become richer without 




The destructive criticism offered by Disraeli put an end to Peel’s leadership of the Conservative 
party. However, his attack did not end at accusing Peel of selling the party to the highest bidder, 
it also labeled Peel as ‘a burglar of others’ intellect’ and claimed that his career had been a crime 
of petty larceny on a grand scale.
278
 This verbal assault on Peel was not only viewed as a 
shocking and unheard of criticism of the Prime Minister, but a final act of division between the 
Peelites and protectionists.
279
 Disraeli’s attack humiliated Peel and left his supporters in the 
House of Commons speechless. Peel’s loyalists and the supporters of Disraeli and Bentinck’s 
rebellion were from this moment on at each other’s throats.  Peel’s response to Disraeli’s speech 
was a direct attack on the character of Disraeli, whom Peel believed was dissatisfied because of 
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his lack of a cabinet appointment in 1841.
280
 With Peel’s counter Disraeli had entered into a 
savage verbal sparring match, which if he was not careful would cost him his newly acquired 
prestige among the Protectionists. His response to Peel’s accusation, especially concerning the 
letter he had written in 1841, was an outright lie.  Disraeli claimed he had never petitioned the 
Prime Minister for office in 1841 (hoping that Peel would not bring forward the letter in 
question).
281




The third reading of the bill to repeal the Corn Laws dealt the final blow to any hopes 
Peel had about maintaining any form of Conservative unity.  Roughly two thirds of his own party 
voted against his call to repeal the Corn Laws in order to provide relief for the growing famine in 
Ireland.  Peel was only able to enact repeal with significant support from the Whigs. However, 
some historians have suggested that protectionism itself was a divisive issue to both parties 
although more so to Peel’s Conservatives than the Whigs.
283
 With a final tally of 355 in favor of 
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Votes on the Third Reading of the Bill to Repeal the Corn Laws, 15 May 1846 










Conservatives 114 32 241 68 355 
Whigs 235 96 10 4 245 
Table 2 Division of Conservative party in the repeal of the Corn Laws
284
 
Disraeli and Bentinck’s rebellion had divided the Conservative party. Disraeli’s scathing 
criticism of Peel and the backbench revolt had effectively terminated Peel’s political career as 
the Conservative leader. Peel had been ousted from the Conservative leadership for breaking 
with what the backbenchers saw as proper Conservative principles.   
Once the House Commons approved repeal it passed to the Lords. In the House of Lords 
a puzzling series of events transpired.  While the Lords remained the bastion of landed privilege 
very little was argued over Corn Law repeal. Only Lord Stanley spoke against the government’s 
decision to repeal the Corn Laws. 285 Stanley’s three hour speech denouncing the government’s 
repeal of the Corn Laws on the 25
th
 of May 1846 illustrated his commitment to the protectionist 
revolt against Peel.  He had argued that repeal of the Corn Laws was a revocation of a national 
policy, which in one shape or another, traced back to the days of Edward IV.
 286
 Historians have 
investigated this series of events and have labeled it as “Peel’s puzzle.” The historian Norman 
Gash’s explanation for swift passage in the Lords, was that the Duke of Wellington’s strict 
military discipline and style of leadership over that chamber, had allowed the Lords to support 
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Peel’s decision despite being against the members’ interests.
287
  However, other historians have 
suggested that both Peel and Wellington convinced the Lords that failure to accept repeal could 
result in a democratic backlash whereas repeal would conserve their political privileges.  This 
explanation seems a more likely fit with Peel’s form of Conservativism that only through 
necessary reform could the rule of the aristocracy be maintained. In August of 1846, Peel wrote 
that although repeal of the Corn Laws broke the Conservative party he believed it was the most 




Bentinck argued that efforts made to include Canada within the protectionist system less 
than three years prior had been swept away in one clean stroke. The Canadian Corn bill and 
efforts made to build an imperial system of preference were now abandoned.  Moreover, an 
abandonment of the Corn Laws was now an abandonment of the colonies of Canada.
289
  Repeal 
of the Corn Laws, in Stanley’s mind, was not only a regressive policy but it undermined national 
self-sufficiency, surrendering national and Imperial self-sufficiency to the whims of the free 
market – all in the name of Irish relief.
290
 The resignation of Lord Stanley on June 28
th
 1846, 
from the Peel cabinet, initiated the physical collapse of the Conservative party. While Stanley’s 
resignation from the government had been long withheld his exit in June symbolized the 
termination of Robert Peel as de facto Conservative leader. Nevertheless, Stanley’s departure and 
Peel’s termination as de facto leader did not mean the end of Tamworth Conservativism. Stanley 
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believed that the division caused by the Corn Law crisis would eventually heal and the party 
would reconcile sometime in the near future.
291
   
While Peel had succeeded in repealing the Corn Laws he had failed to maintain his young 
party’s unity within the terms of his Tamworth Conservativism.  Peel’s resignation from the 
office of Prime Minister the next day on the 29
th
 of June 1846 signaled the official end of his 
leadership of both the United Kingdom and the Conservative party.  While his supporters wished 
to see Peel as the head of a new Peelite party he refused and argued against the formation of 
another ‘Conservative’ party. The Conservative schism after the repeal of the Corn Laws became 
a final and seemingly irrevocable division.  Roughly two thirds of his own party had opposed his 
position on the Corn Laws and sought his removal. Peel had revived the Tories but during the 
course of the Corn Law crisis had watched them retreat into reactionary polices for the second 
time in a generation.
292
  The repeal of the Corn Laws had made Peel a number of political 
enemies in every corner of the House. Those remaining loyal to Peel gave their support to the 
formation of a new “liberal’ Conservative party.
293
   
Still, the Conservative schism over the Corn Laws was not the end of the Conservative 
party. The Conservatives quickly began to reorganize around the remaining leaders; Stanley, 
Disraeli, and Bentinck.  These men became the leading faces of Conservativism in the post-
repeal era. Although most of the talent and the frontbench left with Peel, two thirds of the party 
in the Commons stayed with Bentinck and Disraeli.  While Disraeli and Bentinck became the 
effective leaders in the Commons, the more levelheaded Stanley took control as ‘Conservative’ 
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 Robert Peel to Lord Hardinge September 24, 1846. Robert Peel From his Private Papers Vol. III. ed. Charles 






 His hesitancy to re-form the party around the ‘Protectionist’ label defined him as a 
careful leader that would help rebuild Conservativism after the Corn Law crisis.  Stanley knew 
whatever kind of Conservative organization that survived, he would be its designated leader 
rather than the fiery Lord Bentinck or the power hungry Disraeli.
295
  
Peel had believed in a modernized Tory party that had accepted the changes made after 
1832 and would pursue necessary reform.  Peel had succeeded to a certain extent but where he 
failed was in his judgement of just how far the party would be willing to go. The Conservative 
rebels Disraeli, Bentinck, and Stanley had no desire to return to a pre-Reform Bill Tory party but 
had believed Peel had been pressured by the ACLL and the Whigs to pursue a reform that was 
neither absolutely necessary nor wise.  The Protectionists were reluctant to accept many of Peel’s 
more open compromises (Maynooth and Corn Law repeal) but still had to acknowledge him for 
the fundamental changes he had initiated in the process of modernizing Toryism.  Differences 
over what constituted a proper Conservative ideology through the trials of the Corn Law crisis 
may have unseated Peel and deprived the Conservatives of power for a generation, but repeal 
forced the remaining Conservatives to reexamine themselves and rebuild Conservativism starting 
in 1846. 
  The Conservative split over the repeal of the Corn Laws was incredibly harsh upon 
Conservativism itself. Peel had worked to build a new type of political party that would pursue 
reform and seek to better the institutions of the state through those reforms.  His Tamworth 
Conservativism was designed from the start to act on reforms when necessary.  The Corn Law 
crisis had been an example of necessary reform Peel knew he had to pursue. Peel’s decision to 
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repeal the Corn Laws has been argued to have been a fundamental change in his Conservative 
ideology.  However, much like his decision to support Catholic emancipation in 1828 Peel 
believed himself to be was working to preserve another institution of the state, the aristocracy. 
Earlier attempts to reform the Corn Laws had worked for both Peel and his Conservatives but 
when total repeal became necessary many of his Conservatives thought Peel had abandoned his 
principles rather than remaining consistent. However, his decision to conserve larger institutions 
of the state was, in 1846, in his opinion, a profoundly Conservative action.
296
Whatever Peel’s 
stance on protection was in 1841 or the exact nature of his supposed ‘conversion’ to free trade in 
1845, what remains consistent and important in the history of Peel’s own politics was the idea of 
the necessity of reform to protect what he perceived to be the larger interests of the nation.    
***  
Peel’s second ministry was a case of triumph turned into tragedy.  He had succeeded on 
one hand by transforming the Tories into a new and modernized political organization.  He had 
passed reforms to the Corn Laws and Factory Acts with strong support from his fellow 
Conservatives.  However, this success turned to tragedy starting in 1845.  Peel’s decision to 
expand the Maynooth Grant sparked a long held suspicion that he was betraying Conservative 
principles.  With news of the potato blight in autumn of 1845 Peel, in order to provide relief, 
announced that he had decided to repeal the Corn Laws. This announcement created outrage 
within the party and fueled an ideological split.  Peel’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws 
transformed his triumph of 1841 into a Conservative tragedy in 1846.  The division of the 
Conservative party in 1846 resulted in a failure by Peel to see a full application of his Tamworth 
Conservativism as the official party doctrine.  
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However, the application of Tamworth Conservativism as the official party doctrine did 
not fail entirely.  Until the Corn Law crisis (or at least the Maynooth Grant) a majority of his 
party accepted his idea of necessary reform as a way to preserve institutions of the state. Even 
Peel’s great opponent Benjamin Disraeli had praised Peel for this type of forward thinking.
297
 
Peel’s reforms to the Corn Laws in 1842-3 were met with Conservative support and his reforms 
to the Factory Act were even expanded and pushed further independent of Peel.  The application 
of Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism had, until the Corn Law crisis, succeeded in transforming 
the Tories into a modernized political party. Peel’s Tamworth Conservatism failed during the 
Corn Law crisis not because it was a weak ideology but because the Tories were still in the 
process of being transformed into Conservatives. Stanley’s takeover as leader of the party, post-
repeal, illustrated the ongoing transformation because despite his beliefs about protection and the 
Corn Laws, Stanley and, to a lesser extent, Disraeli were looking to reconcile the two groups of 
Conservatives within one party. The irony in the post repeal Conservative party would be that the 
second application of Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism would be carried out by the very people 
that had unseated him in 1846.  Their return to Peel’s founding ideas would solidify the political 
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THE LEGACY OF TAMWORTH CONSERVATISM  
By the end of June of 1846, the collapse of the Conservative party had been finalized. 
The backbench revolt had caused a schism within the young Conservative party over the repeal 
of the Corn Laws. With the Corn Laws effectively repealed, Peel had resigned as Prime Minister. 
His resignation and retreat from leadership signaled a crisis within the Conservative party.  
Stanley’s departure from the Cabinet the day before Peel’s resignation on June 28
th
 had 
formalized the creation of a Protectionist faction within the majority of the Conservative party.
298
  
The chaos of the Corn Law crisis had deprived the remaining Conservatives of their leaders and 
left the new Peelite faction without a sizeable body in the Commons. This problem forced the 
remaining Conservative party leaders to establish an ideology that separated them from the 
Peelites and which could become the basis of a re-imagined party. 
However, it was not a simple task confronting the Conservative rebels.  A new party for a 
new age was something Peel himself had attempted to build in 1834 with his Tamworth 
Manifesto.  Stanley, Bentinck, and Disraeli as the triumvirate of new Conservative leaders had to 
reform the Conservative party and either accept the repeal of the Corn Laws or continue to fight 
what appeared to be the losing battle for protectionism. Peel’s Tamworth Conservatism after 
1846 would diverge into two directions under new leadership.  The Peelite faction would attempt 
to assert its independence but, until the death of Peel in 1850, the Peelite ideology remained 
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rather stagnant.  The Protectionists meanwhile would struggle with protectionism for another six 
years before officially casting it off as a party policy.  A redesign of Conservativism after the 
Corn Law crisis became a question of principles that both the Peelites and Protectionists faced.  
While Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism remained part of the central framework, a new series of 
changes arose that helped to reshape his Conservativism in the post repeal era.   
 
Peelite Conservatism beyond the Corn Law Crisis  
The repeal of the Corn Laws had essentially divided Conservativism into two groups in 
1846, the “Liberal’ Peelites and the Protectionist Tories. Despite the major difference separating 
the two Conservative ‘parties’ – essentially the question of free trade–  the Peelites and 
Protectionists still shared a common core Conservativism.
299
  However, the rift created by the 
fight to repeal the Corn Laws was much larger and more personal than a disagreement over  free 
trade. Peel’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws had left his party in shambles and he was not 
prepared for the political outcomes of repeal. Peel had professed that repeal was a Conservative 
action, however, the Protectionist rebellion illustrated that he and his party were not on the same 
page. His resignation as leader of the Conservative party and refusal to become the leader of the 
Peelite ‘party’ left his post-repeal loyalists in a difficult position.  For the Peelites the lack of 
leadership from Robert Peel was highly problematic.  Peel’s loyalists did not want to force him 
to act as a leader but his reluctance to do so left them questioning his leadership..   
On the same night in which Wellington was able to pass repeal through the Lords Peel’s 
Irish Coercion bill was defeated in the commons 292 to 219.  The defeat of this Bill brought a 
formal end to Peel’s tenure as Prime minister.  His defeat and resignation, although finalized by 
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the failed attempt to pass an Irish Coercion Bill, was clearly the result of the repeal of the Corn 
Laws.  To that end Peel’s resignation speech recognized the skill of the ACLL orator and MP 
Richard Cobden.  As Peel put it, “the name which ought to be and will be associated with the 
success of these measures is the name of Richard Cobden. Without scruple, Sir, I attribute the 
success of these measures to him.”
300
 Peel’s mention of Cobden in his resignation speech was a 
deliberate rubbing of salt in his party’s wounds. The resignation of Sir Robert Peel was 
illustrated in the July 11
th
 edition of Punch.  Titled Manager Peel Taking his Farewell Benefit 
Peel is seen receiving praise from all corners of the stage except from the lone figure of 
Benjamin Disraeli, who is shaking his fist in disgust at Peel.
301
 Disraeli was mocked again by 
Punch in the January 1847 issue. Punch’s ridicule of Disraeli in the cartoon titled The Rising 
Generation in Parliament illustrated the foppish upstart plotting his next move against Peel and 
Parliament (Figure 2.2).
302
 In the cartoon, Peel asks Disraeli “Well, My little man, what are you 
going to do this session Eh!” Disraeli responds with “Why-aw-aw-I’ve made arraignments-aw-
to-smash-aw-everybody.”  
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Figure 2. The Rising Generation in Parliament 
Punch’s depiction of Disraeli in 1847 illustrated both the continued division of Conservative 
forces and the widespread mistrust of Disraeli after his brutal treatment of Peel in June of 1846.  
Many of the Peelites felt Disraeli’s attacks on the Prime Minster were completely uncalled for 
and could not see themselves reunited with a ‘snake in the grass’ such as he.  Likewise the 
Protectionists were not too keen on a reunification either as they believed Peel had been 
abandoning Conservative institutions right and left in favor of national prestige and Whig 
appeasement.
303
   
For the next four years both the Protectionists and Peelites sat on the same front bench 
with Peel and Disraeli only three seats away from one another.
304
 Peel, after his resignation, 
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retreated to the life of an average MP.  However, the former premier could not simply withdraw 
himself and expect to be left alone.  Although he continued to represent the borough of 
Tamworth Peel refrained from entering major political debates or acting as a figurehead to his 
Conservative loyalists. In a letter to Peel the Duke of Bedford stated that the moment Peel had 
chosen to repeal the Corn Laws was perfect.  By suffering the political ramifications, Peel had 
acted as a true Conservative to preserve the nation from the class warfare that surely could have 
developed had the Corn Laws remained.
305
In his own opinion Peel agreed with the Duke of 
Bedford and believed that repealing the Corn Laws was a profoundly Conservative action.
306
 It 
was this belief that kept many of the Peelites from joining with Russell’s Whigs.  His Peelites 
had a foot in both parties but were part of neither. 
One of Peel’s greatest supporters, W.E. Gladstone, followed Peel to support repeal and 
became an important figure in the Peelite faction.  Gladstone despised what the Protectionists, 
especially Disraeli, had done to Peel and, together with Sir James Graham and the Earl of 
Aberdeen, formed the core of the Peelite leadership in the post repeal era.
307
However, Gladstone 
was critical of Peel’s defeatism and Peel’s complete refusal to lead the Peelite faction as he had 
lead the Conservative party before.  Gladstone wrote that “in the midst of the struggle he [Peel] 
came to feel its real intensity he seems in his own mind to have substituted indifference about the 
destruction of the party which was so eminently HIS.”
308
 The Conservative schism that had 
occurred over the Corn Laws had broken the party and politics of Peel. Gladstone argued that 
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Peel should take back control over what he had created: “It might have been in his power to 
make some provision for the holding together, or for the reconstruction, of that great party which 
he has reared”.
309
As Gladstone had argued, Peel seemingly remained defeated by the beating he 
had suffered at the hands of Disraeli and his refusal to move towards reconciliation meant that 
the party he had created, based on his principles and ideas, remained completely estranged from 
him. 
Gladstone was not alone in his criticism of Peel’s defeatist attitude. Peel’s close associate 
and former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Henry Goulburn, petitioned Peel in late December of 
1846, and argued that Peel should lead the Peelites as a new party against the Protectionists. 
Goulburn wrote, 
My own view is that the position which we ought to take would be one of 
observation rather than of party opposition to the government, showing ourselves 
constantly alive to the real interests of the country, neither refusing to support the 
government in opposing the mad projects of the Protectionists
310
 
Goulburn’s petition to Peel suggested a middle ground for the Peelites.  They could oppose the 
Protectionists by supporting Russell but they should also oppose Russell on certain issues to state 
their own Conservative independence. Peel’s reply to Goulburn illustrated that such appeals were 
to no avail.  The personal abuse he had taken from Disraeli and Bentinck over protectionism had 
been so devastating that he could not- or would not- seek office again, and was unwilling to lead 
the Peelites as a new party.  Peel wrote back to Goulburn arguing, 
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As I am not prepared to enter into that combination-as from feeling which I 
cannot control the necessity of resuming power would be perfectly odious to me. I 
am wholly disqualified for the reorganization of a party.
311
 
Peel’s defeatist attitude towards party reorganization after repeal meant that while he was the 
‘leader’ of the Peelites he refused to actually lead them anywhere.  Since repeal the majority of 
the frontbench had abandoned the Conservative party, and formed the Peelite faction.  Arguably 
the Peelites had a strong talent pool, but with the lack of guidance and direction from Peel it left 
many questioning the future of the Peelite faction.  
The four years after repeal were ones of great frustration for Peel’s loyalists.  His 
defeatist attitude and refusal to act as a leader meant that his supporters were stuck between the 
Whigs and the Protectionists with virtually no direction. Peelite Conservatives like Gladstone 
and Goulburn expressed disappointment with Peel. Their disapproval of Peel’s leadership 
centered around his desire to have them support every measure of the Whig government without 
any restriction.  Their criticism in this regard was that if they were to support the government 
unconditionally how could they maintain their independence as Peelites? Gladstone and 
Goulburn set up meetings in 1849 with Peel to discuss their policy over the repeal of the 
Navigation Acts.  To their embarrassment, Peel was unwilling to support any kind of 
‘conditional legislation’ for Peelite support of repeal and desired to see Russell’s government 
remain undefeated.
312
  Peel believed that a second battle over free trade and protection would 
take place if Russell’s government was defeated, and that to prevent a re-imposition of 
protectionism, Russell’s government had to stand.
313
This unconditional support for the 
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government was tolerated by many of the Peelites and the Navigation Acts were successfully 
repealed.  
To the Peelites, the repeal of the Navigation Acts signaled the last hope the Protectionists 
had to reinstate protectionism.  As Graham wrote, “they are carrying on a Conservative 
Government, and to keep the ship afloat they have to pitch over, day by day.”
314
Graham’s 
metaphor of bailing out a sinking ship illustrated that the Protectionist support of protectionism 
was slowly undoing itself.  The reality as of late 1849 was that protectionist principles were 
becoming more and more unfashionable and unrealistic.  Therefore many of the Peelites did not 
share Peel’s fear of a coming second battle of protection versus free trade.  They believed that 
sooner, rather than later, the Protectionists had to abandon protectionism for their own sake. 
Peel’s fear of the Protectionists implementing a New Corn Law was, by late 1849, becoming 
increasingly unrealistic. However he still believed that until the Protectionists could no longer re-
introduce protection the Peelites had to support the Russell government in all its endeavors.
315
 
For four years, the Peelites had given the Whig government their firm support, in every 
matter of policy.  Their alliance remained close until the Don Pacifico debate of 1850. This 
incident illustrated that although Peel believed in supporting the Whigs, to prevent the revival of 
Protectionism, Peel and the Peelites had not entered into a union with Russell’s party.
316
 Peel’s 
response to the government’s (especially Lord Palmerston’s) actions during the Don Pacifico 
affair illustrated his dedication to Conservative principles. To him the irresponsible behavior on 
the part of the government went against the principle of a careful approach to all matters for the 













good of the nation that he had advocated for his entire life. The debate focused on the 
compensation of a British subject who had been attacked in Athens.  The subject, Don Pacifico, 
had appealed to the Greek government for compensation for loss of property and when that was 
denied he appealed to the British.  It was in Peel’s opinion that the response by the British 
government to pressure the Greeks, through military blockade, to compensate Pacifico was 
outrageous.  The blockading of Greece’s main port by a British naval squadron caused 
diplomatic tensions between Greece and Britain, which was supposedly under British protection.   
This poorly managed diplomacy was something which Peel felt was not right, and he argued that 
the Peelites ought not to remain silent.  The speech Peel delivered on June 28
th
 1850 was his last 
recorded speech in the House of Commons and was one not unworthy of being his final political 
statement. Lord Palmerston had argued that it was the duty of the British government to protect 
its citizens all over the world and he invoked the phrase ‘Civis Romanus sum’ (I am a Roman 
citizen) to support his reasoning.
317
  Peel’s response showed no compromise of principle in its 
delivery.  He argued that Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston’s actions in securing compensation 
for the British subject Don Pacifico were extreme and not an act of careful, well thought out 
diplomacy.  As Peel argued, 
Diplomacy is a costly engine for maintaining peace, a remarkable instrument used 
by civilised nations for the purpose of preventing war. Unless it be used to 
appease the angry passions of individual men and check the feelings which arise 




Peel’s final speech concerning the approach by the government to such diplomacy suggested that 
such actions were not only rash but also outright irresponsible. The government should not have 
                                                          
317
 Lord Palmerston’s speech on the Affairs of Greece June 25, 1850. Hansard, 3
rd




 Robert Peel. The Affairs of Greece June 28, 1850. Speeches of the Late Right Honourable Robert Peel, Bart Peel 




taken such a heavy-handed action and acted without careful consideration for the broader 
national interest, the main touchstone of Peel’s entire career.  
Tragically, the very next day, while out riding Peel was thrown from his horse and 
succumbed to his injuries only three days later on July 2
nd
 1850. The Prime Minister, John 
Russell’s tribute to Peel, noted that Peel’s actions both before and during the Corn Law crisis had 
crafted him into the finest statesman of his age.
319
  The Conservative/Protectionist reaction to 
Peel’s death also came with praise, despite the remaining feelings of his betrayal over 
protectionism.  Disraeli wrote that despite Peel’s desertion from his own party twice (Catholic 
emancipation and the Corn Laws) he was able to accomplish reforms of which the Whigs could 
only have dreamed.
320
 Peel’s legacy was recognized by his allies and opponents alike. Peel’s 
Tamworth Conservativism had established the fundamental idea behind a political party based 
around the preservation of institutions central to the state through careful reform.  His Tamworth 
Manifesto was the key document behind this idea, and outlined how Conservativism was to 
approach reform and guide institutions of the state from the past into the present.   
With the untimely death of Peel the leadership of the Peelites shifted to W.E. Gladstone, 
Henry Goulburn, the Earl of Aberdeen, and Lord Ripon.
321
  While each of these former 
Conservatives had been critical of Peel in his last four years of life, they still remained followers 
of his Tamworth Conservativism. With Peel dead, the continuation of the Peelites as an 
independent party became difficult. Their alliance with the Whigs for the past four years had 
created a strong bond.  Additionally, the Peelites had voted unconditionally with the Whig 
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government on nearly every occasion with the Don Pacifico debate being the sole exception. 
Peel’s death in1850 cemented the division between the Peelites and Stanley’s 
Conservative/Protectionist party. Gladstone himself had refused to rejoin the party in which his 
great rival Benjamin Disraeli had unseated his hero Sir Robert Peel.
322
 Gladstone, now at the 
helm of the Peelite party, would eventually become the quintessential Victorian Liberal based on 
the ideas of Robert Peel.  His rivalry with Disraeli would see both aspects of Peel’s politics 
(liberal and conservative) played out as the two dominant forms of political thought throughout 
the second half of the nineteenth century.
323
  
Peel’s coalition with the Whigs was an unhappy marriage, but one that he (and the 
Peelites) infinitely preferred to one with the Protectionists.   His last four years of life have been 
observed by historians and his contemporaries alike to be the anti-climax to his political 
career.
324
  However, his ‘defeatism’ as Gladstone had portrayed it, was not without motivation.  
Peel’s unquestioning support for the Whigs, until his death, was done to ensure that when 
Stanley’s Conservatives/Protectionists regained control of the government they would be unable 
to re-impose protection.  This strategy to prevent a return to protection, some historians have 
argued, was why Peel never took the Peelite faction and fashioned it as a new political party. 
Other historians like Boyd Hilton have argued that Peel’s support of the Whigs helped to fashion 
an alliance that would become the Liberal party.
 325
  Whatever the case, Peel’s refusal to act as a 
leader of the Peelites, and his aversion to a return to office meant that his personal role in 
shaping Conservativism had ended. The final years of Sir Robert Peel’s life saw the torch of his 
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Tamworth Conservativism being passed on to others.  While his Peelite supporters namely 
Aberdeen, Goulburn, and Gladstone, remained highly critical of Peel’s defeatist attitude after 
1846, they would be instrumental in advancing their versions of Peel’s ideology in the Peelite 
and later Liberal parties. 
 
The Remaking of the Conservative Party  
Conversely, the Protectionists lead by Stanley, Bentinck, and Disraeli had to fashion their 
own party in the post-repeal era to separate it from Peel. The attempts to return to protection after 
the Conservative schism did not work thanks to the Peelite support for the Whig government.  
Additionally, the repeal of the Navigation Acts in 1849 signaled an increasingly difficult battle 
for the Protectionists.  With both the Corn Laws and the Navigation Acts repealed Stanley had 
argued that the Protectionists should return to calling themselves ‘Conservatives’ in order to 
distance themselves from the growingly unpopular issue of Protectionism.  Bentinck had rejected 
Stanley’s earlier suggestion in 1848 to return to calling themselves ‘the Conservative party’ and 
advocated calling the party ‘the Protectionists’.  While Bentinck had some support, building a 
party on such a single idea (economic protectionism) was not a long term plan likely to win the 
support of the electorate.  Stanley’s attempt to return to the Conservative label was the first step 
towards a return to Peel’s Tamworth Conservative message.
326
  As the leading advocate Stanley 
could not have been a better candidate.  His earlier Knowsley Creed nearly mirrored Peel’s 
Tamworth Manifesto and the Conservativism they both shared.  A decision by the Protectionists 
to return to Tamworth Conservativism in 1852 was decided upon only after a serious 
reorganization of the Conservative party, the death of a leading Protectionist and defeat of 
                                                          
326




protectionism itself. Stanley’s objective in his return to Tamworth Conservativism was in part a 
way to reconcile the differences between the Protectionists and the Peelites  but more 
importantly as a way to maintain a Conservative force to oppose what he saw as the destruction 
of state institutions under the pretext of reform.
327
  
In the aftermath of the Corn Law crisis the Protectionists had retreated into opposition.  
While the Protectionist leadership struggled to maintain some type of control over the party it did 
not fade like the Tory party had after the Reform Bill.  The Conservative/Protectionist party from 
1846 until 1852 had remained a legitimate opposition to the Whigs and Peelites despite its 
internal fracture over the Corn Laws.  The new Protectionist leaders, struggled to reestablish the 
party.  Repeal had devastated the electoral majority that the Conservatives once had, and the 
Peelite support of the Whig government contributed to a brain drain of the party’s best talents.  
Table 3 shows how the Conservative party fared in the elections of 1847 and 1852. Official 
figures for the Peelites were counted into the Conservative block despite internal party 
difference. Rough estimates suggest that out of the 325 Conservatives in 1847 about 1/3 (112) 
were Peelites and after the death of Peel (1850) the number had dropped further (80) by 1852 as 
more either returned to the Conservative party or joined the Whigs. 
General Election Results 1847 & 1852 
 1847 1852 
Conservatives/Peelites 213/112 (325) 250/80 (330) 
Whigs 292 324 
Irish Repeal 36 0 
Chartist 1 0 
Table 3 Election results for 1847 & 1852
328
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Stanley and Bentinck’s dual leadership had to rebuild Conservativism as a way to prove to the 
electorate, that despite their opposition to repeal of the Corn Laws, theirs was the party most 
dedicated to preserving and maintaining the important institutions of the state.  In comparison 
Stanley was clearly a much better leader and more pragmatic than Bentinck.  However, from his 
position in the House of Lords he had very little control over the Protectionists in the House and 
he needed Bentinck’s assistance to help him in the reestablishment of the Conservative party.
329
  
The leadership of the Protectionist party in the House of Commons from 1846-1852, fell 
to the partnership of Bentinck and Disraeli. With Stanley in the House of Lords, Bentinck 
became the new ‘Conservative’ leader in the House of Commons.  While Bentinck seems an odd 
choice, rather than the more cunning Disraeli, it was actually the most logical.  Bentinck, the son 
of a Duke (William Bentinck 4
th
 Duke of Portland), was the best representative the Protectionists 
could have and trust.  Disraeli on the other hand was not a landed aristocrat and as the son of a 
converted Jew he was still perceived as an outsider.  Additionally, his ungentlemanly attacks, 
both personal and political, against Peel made him a suspicious figure, even to the Protectionists. 
Bentinck, now the head of the Protectionist Conservatives in the Commons, took every 
opportunity to attack the Peelites with ferocity equal to that which he had demonstrated during 
the Corn Law debates.  In one instance, Bentinck offended Gladstone so badly that any 
reconciliation with Gladstone and other leading Peelites proved impossible.
330
 Stanley, as head 
of the Protectionist Conservatives, attempted to keep Bentinck in check but Bentinck seemed to 
follow his own rules. The growing rift between Bentinck and Stanley was not going to heal 
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anytime soon and Bentinck’s leadership in the Commons seemed to take direction away from 
Stanley as Conservative party leader. 
The election of 1847 had seen the election of a single Jewish member, who like Daniel 
O’Connell (A Catholic Irishman) twenty years earlier, was prohibited from sitting in the House.  
The Whig government had proposed an amendment allowing the member to sit but Stanley and 
other Conservatives opposed the measure.  However, both Bentinck and Disraeli (for personal 
reasons), supported the Bill to emancipate the Jews. Disraeli’s speech in support of this measure 
was received by the government as brave but called blasphemous by his own party.  His 
statement: “where is your Christianity if you do not believe in their Judaism?" was not well 
received by Stanley or many other Protectionists.
 331
 The bill passed its third reading in the 
Commons in May 1848 but was defeated by Stanley and the Protectionists in the House of 
Lords.  Bentinck’s subsequent resignation as Conservative leader in the Commons was a direct 
result of his failure to gather sufficient Protectionist support for the Jewish emancipation bill.   
Bentinck’s resignation left a gaping hole in the leadership of the Commons.  Stanley 
pleaded with Bentinck to reconsider his resignation but Bentinck refused. With Disraeli 
suggested as a potential candidate Stanley instead offered the position to the Marquess of 
Granby. Stanley’s mistrust of Disraeli remained strong both after his ‘blasphemous’ speech over 
Jewish emancipation and his memorable verbal destruction of the former Prime Minister. 
However, Granby upon realizing the weight of the office, resigned and the Conservative 
Protectionists in the Commons were left without a leader.
332
  Bentinck still refused to return to 
the post and Stanley, hesitant to pass up Disraeli a second time, left the post vacant.  In his 
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opinion, as long as Bentinck was still in the Commons, he could act as unofficial leader and 
Stanley could avoid dealing with Disraeli.  
By early 1848 Stanley had given up on reviving Protectionism and had resolved upon a 
return to Conservativism. 
333
  The greatest opponent to this abandonment was, of course, Lord 
George Bentinck. In his exchanges with Bentinck, Stanley made it clear that the political 
atmosphere had changed, and that a leader and his party had to act in unison. Stanley wrote to 
Bentinck explaining the fundamental problem of Peel’s government was that he failed to follow 
his own party.  As he put it, “Peel’s great error had always been disregarding the opinion of his 
party, whenever it did not exactly square with his own; and I am confident that no man in these 
days can hope to lead a party who cannot make up his mind sometime to follow it.”
334
  Stanley’s 
comment to Bentinck was designed to mitigate some of the damages between the two and realign 
the Protectionist leadership in both Houses. But it was impossible for Bentinck to accept the 
‘appeasement’ of free trade.  To accept the repeal of the Corn Laws and the abandonment of 
protectionism was to accept Peel’s Conservative apostasy, the very thing he had risen to fight 
against. 
In one sense Stanley’s problem of leadership in the Commons deepened when, late in 
September of 1848, Lord George Bentinck’s body was discovered after he failed to arrive at a 
dinner party.  The unexpected death of Bentinck from a heart attack meant that once again 
Stanley was going to have to address the issue of party leader in the Commons. Before his death 
Bentinck had been acting as the unofficial party leader in the Commons.  With Bentinck dead, 
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Disraeli quickly took it upon himself to act as unofficial leader of the Conservative/Protectionist 
party in the Commons.
 335
   Although Stanley still did not particularly like Disraeli, seeing 
Disraeli as a bit of an upstart, he recognized him as the only remaining Conservative with any 
real merit. Although Stanley mistrusted Disraeli he was keen to avoid the same fate that had 
befallen Peel. With Disraeli already acting as unofficial leader in the Commons, Stanley 
succumbed to his initiative and finally offered Disraeli the position as the official leader of the 
Commons in January of 1849. 
The following two years were especially brutal for Stanley’s Protectionists.  In the 
aftermath of the death of Bentinck, the Conservatives had a greater problem, the future of 
protectionism. The repeal of the Navigation Acts in 1849 spelled the greatest defeat for 
protection as a national policy since the repeal of the Corn Laws. Stanley realized that with the 
Navigation Acts repealed and Bentinck dead protection was no longer a feasible base for the 
party. 
336
 Stanley’s wish to abandon protectionism (not endorse free trade) as an official party 
doctrine had been a point of tension between Stanley and Bentinck but with Bentinck’s death 
Stanley now had the opportunity to begin a return to Conservativism. This ‘return’ was clearly 
designed to bring the Protectionists back towards the political center and revive to the successful 
ideas that both Stanley and Peel had held during the formative years of the Conservative party. 
To maintain the support of Lord Bentinck’s allies, Stanley had to carefully craft the language 
with which the Conservatives would abandon protectionism. Both Stanley and the new leader of 
the Commons, Disraeli, agreed that a return to the Corn Laws and protectionist policy was 
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impossible and politically damaging.
337
 However, their actions in 1846 had to be justified in 
some way. They agreed that the battle over the Corn Laws had to be about party unity and 
response to the will of the electorate. Disraeli stated that the election of 1841 was about the 
support of protection and in 1846 Peel had acted against that decision as well as the will of his 
party in favor of external forces.
338
  In this way, the protectionist rebellion against Peel was 
wholly justified on ethical not ideological grounds. 
The abandonment of protectionist policies was not an easy pill for the Protectionists to 
swallow, but a necessary one. Stanley’s desire to return his party to the political center required 
that protectionism be set aside, not abandoned. Protectionist organizations like the CAPS had 
struggled with the weakened position of protectionism after the repeal of the Corn Laws. The 
farmers within the society had advocated for the total repeal of the Malt tax ever since the Corn 
Laws were repealed in 1846.  However, this anti-protectionist action from within a protection 
society was very disturbing to Richmond and Stanley.  Farmers within the organization in 
February of 1849 had voted for the third year in a row that the Conservative party, or what was 
left of it, should advocate for the repeal of the Malt tax. This suggestion was met with disgust 
from the Protectionists who argued that such a repeal, like the repeal of the Corn Laws, was no 
gain to the English farmer.
339
Additionally, Protectionist members of the society argued that since 
the repeal of the Corn Laws the decline in the price of bread had not been as substantial as ACLL 
propaganda had suggested it would be.
340
Therefore they argued that repealing the Malt tax would 
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have no long term benefits to the farmers. However, this argument did not settle matters and the 
farmers in the society continued to call for repeal. In February of 1850, Stanley knew that the 
farmers in the society would vote again to call for the Malt tax to be repealed and that the 
Protectionist leaders would again refuse to act.  Carefully calculating his moves Stanley knew 
that he could never convince his party to advocate repealing a protectionist measure but also 
realized, that with the Navigation Acts and Lord Bentinck gone, protectionism was a dying 
platform. Therefore Stanley and other Protectionists argued that the defense of protection should 
be diverted to other institutions and that opposition should be focused selectively on the things 
most tied to free-trade and economic liberalism. 
The notion that free-trade and economic liberalism went hand in hand with a debased 
democracy and the dismantling of the aristocracy, the empire, and the crown was the primary 
reason protectionism remained vital for Conservatives until 1852. Stanley himself had argued in 
1846 that repeal was an economic abandonment of the colonial empire.
341
 The ‘abandonment’ of 
protection by Stanley’s Conservatives was not to abandon those ideas associated with it, such as 
empire and the aristocracy.  Instead, the defense of empire and the preservation of the rights of 
the aristocracy would take the place of protection. With the decline of the CAPS the newly 
formed National Association of the Protection of British Industry and Capital [NAPIC] wrote a 
report that illustrated the changing perception of protectionism.  The NAPIC argued that the 
agitation led by the ACLL was only the start of a greater ‘war of the classes’ directed at the 
aristocracy.
342
 This war of the classes, Protectionists argued, was part of an attempt to tear down 
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the traditional institutions supported by the aristocracy.  These same Protectionists argued in 
1850, as they had in 1844, for an alliance of the working classes and aristocracy to defend the 
traditional ways of life from destruction by the manufacturing class. Additionally, members of 
the NAPIC argued that organizations like the ACLL had used the repeal of the Corn Laws as the 
starting point to “ulterior projects of a political nature.”
343
 Democracy and the potential 
destruction of the aristocracy were of great concern to members of the NAPIC and the 
Conservative party.  These ‘ulterior projects’ identified by the NAPIC were arguably aimed at 
destroying the political power of the aristocracy and the monarchy.  Therefore protectionism was 
one of the first things targeted by these radical forces.  As the NAPIC suggested, defending other 
aspects such as the power of the monarchy and the aristocracy could help to prevent a ‘war of the 
classes’. In order for Stanley to rehabilitate the Conservative party and convince its members  to 
‘abandon’ protection he would have to convince the Protectionists that defending protectionism 
was actually ancillary to maintaining the institutions that truly needed to be defended. 
To Stanley it was clear that the remaining protectionist arguments were losing ground 
quickly.  However, convincing the Protectionists to abandon protection was as likely as getting 
them to accept free-trade.  What Stanley needed to do was to convince the Protectionists to focus 
their energy on other things associated with free trade such as democracy, and the dismantling of 
the aristocracy and the empire.  Therefore, the ‘abandonment’ of the issue of protection in 1852 
was more or less a reorganization of the Conservative hierarchy of interests, placing protection 
on a lower level of importance.  The Conservative position on protection in 1852 was 
summarized by Disraeli in blatant terms: “Protection is not only dead but damned.”
344
   His 
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statement concerning the death of protectionism argued that, he, like Peel in 1829 with Catholic 
emancipation, had to accept repeal of the Corn Laws as a necessary reform.  The final acceptance 
of Corn Law repeal by the Conservatives in 1852 was not surrender to free trade ideology but 
rather the acceptance of a policy that was now irrevocable.  
The Conservative leadership after 1852 solidified around Stanley and Disraeli. The 
collapse of Russell’s ministry in February of 1852 over borough reform brought the 
Conservatives back into power for the first time since the repeal of the Corn Laws.  The 
formation of Stanley’s first ministry (February 23 1852-December 19 1852), known as the “who, 
who?” ministry, saw to the final reformation of the Conservative party and the ‘abandonment ‘of 
protectionism.
345
  The general election of 1852 saw a reorganization of the Conservative 
hierarchy of constitutional issues.  Stanley, after assuming the office of Prime Minister, was 
more concerned about reforms to Parliament than the continuation of protection.
346
 
Protectionism, which had suffered a colossal defeat in 1849 with the repeal of the Navigation 
Acts, was shifted to a lower level of importance.  Stanley’s re-organization of the Conservative 
hierarchy led his government to address the more important perceived threats to the Church and 
other institutions of the state rather than focus on the dying idea of protectionism.
347
 Stanley 
believed that the Conservatives should avoid apposing all reforms or else they may suffer defeat 
against the growing coalition between the Peelites and the Whigs.  His suggestion to have his 
party support reforms, especially Parliamentary, was a return to the Conservative idea that 
Stanley had embraced in 1835.  Stanley’s argument to his party was that to support the 
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institutions of the state, especially the power of the aristocracy, the Conservatives would have to 
work for parliamentary reform.
348
   
Stanley’s return to Tamworth Conservativism began with the reorganization of the 
hierarchy of Conservative importance.  Stanley could not feasibly convince the party to abandon 
protectionism in its entirety. However, as John Wilson Croker argued in March of 1852 
protection was subordinate to the ‘immediate and imperious’ dangers to the Constitution, 
Church, and State.  Croker argued that by placing economic protection on a lower level of 
importance Conservatives could focus on ‘the most pressing duty of the country, to try and 
preserve itself from a revolutionary government.’
349
 The reorganization of the Conservative 
hierarchy allowed for Stanley’s Conservatives to ‘abandon’ protectionism and reinstate 
Tamworth Conservativism as its core strategy.  This decision by the party to pick and choose its 
battles, and selectively oppose measures that were deemed unnecessary, was identical to the 
message Peel had advocated in his Tamworth Manifesto nearly twenty years prior. Additionally, 
Stanley had come to accept that the repeal of the Corn Laws and the decline of protection were 
permanent.  Much like  Peel had done in the case of Catholic emancipation and the Great Reform 
Bill, Stanley too had to see repeal as a necessary reform to preserve the overall nature of the 
government and so too did the Protectionists. By accepting that repeal was irrevocable and 
necessary Stanley had followed his, and Peel’s, principles that had existed as Conservative party 
canon since 1834. 
The vote of no confidence against the Russell government in 1852 allowed Stanley and 
the Conservatives a chance to return to government.  While Stanley (officially called The 14
th
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Earl of Derby) had accepted that protection needed to be abandoned many of his Conservatives 
still did not.  Stanley was pressured by Lord Beaumont to say whether or not he planned for his 
Ministry to bring back the Corn Laws. Artfully dodging the question, Stanley assured his party 
that such a matter would not be addressed unless it needed to be.
350
 Upon forming his Ministry, 
Stanley wanted to avoid another mishap with Disraeli as Peel had in 1841. Appointing Disraeli 
as the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his 1852 Ministry, Stanley began to work with Disraeli to 
reinstate Tamworth Conservativism. Disraeli may have looked like a bit of a misfit surrounded 
by aristocrats and landed gentry, but he was twice as bright as any of them and people like 
Stanley had to recognize Disraeli for his talent. In comparison, the remainder of the Conservative 
party lacked quality orators or basic competence but, what it lacked Disraeli could make up for 
tenfold, as so Disraeli thought!   
The continuation of the Conservative party, albeit divided, owes its post-repeal existence 
to Peel’s original design of the party. Stanley and, to some degree, Disraeli were keen to return to 
an era that had certain Conservative ideological characteristics before the split over the Corn 
Laws.  Stanley’s objective after 1852 was to steer the Conservative party out of the trouble it had 
placed itself in.
351
 For him it was more than a debate between protection and free trade, it was 
about creating a party that could carefully move the old establishment into the nineteenth 
century.
352
 Critics and historians alike have observed that the Conservative party under Stanley 
(Derby) from 1846-1868 was badly disoriented.  However, the twenty-two years of Stanley’s 
leadership illustrated a return to Conservativism.  Under Stanley the Conservatives were led by a 
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man, schooled in the successes and failures of Conservative, was well as Whig, government. The 
irony of Stanley’s leadership was that the man who brought back Peel’s Tamworth 
Conservativism, and the electoral success that accompanied it, was exactly the kind of man who 
Disraeli’s characters Tadpole and Taper had mocked in Coningsby in 1844. 
353
 Stanley’s tenure 
as party leader saw a revival of Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism and ensured that under his 
leadership the Conservatives would return to be the moderate custodians of the institutions of 
Church and State.  It was only fitting that Stanley would lead this post-repeal return to 
Conservativism as his original Knowsley Creed had so closely mirrored Peel’s own Tamworth 
Conservativism.
354
 The principles that Stanley, and Peel, had stood for again became the 
foundation of the Conservative party.  Stanley’s leadership and return to Conservativism in 1852 
would bear witness to his determination to make the Conservatives part of the political center, 
something he had advocated for in his Knowsley Creed nearly twenty years earlier. 
While Stanley remained the effective leader of the Conservative party until his death in 
1869, Disraeli would also take the mantle of Peel and begin to build a new Conservative party 
beyond both Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism and Stanley’s Knowsley Creed.  Disraeli’s 
Conservativism would honor the ideas of careful reform set in motion by Peel and expand them 
to give Conservativism strong principles. First described in Coningsby and Sybil Disraeli began 
to establish a definition for a post-Tamworth Conservative ideology.  It was through these ideas 
that Disraeli had professed in his earlier writings, commenting on Robert Peel’s lack of 
principles, prescriptions, or preparations for the future that helped to shape the establishment of a 
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Conservative political ideology after the death of Peel.
355
 Peel’s position on the Maynooth Grant, 
the Repeal of the Corn Laws and Catholic emancipation two decades earlier were evidence 
enough that Peel had betrayed Tory principles.  However, his ‘betrayal’ was not a form of Whig 
appeasement but an attempt to change the Tories into a new Conservative party.   
As Disraeli wrote in Sybil, Peel’s party was “an old crazy factor, vamped up, and white-
washed into decency” that is to say, Peel had attempted to fix the problems the Tories faced in 
1832, but Disraeli argued that they were not repaired by his Manifesto in 1834.
 356
   Peel’s 
Conservative party was simply a disguised version of the old dysfunctional Tory party.  As some 
historians have suggested it would be Disraeli’s politics that would unify the ideas of Empire, the 
Church and the franchise together into his notion of one-nation Conservativism. 
357
 However, 
Disraeli’s Conservativism could not have succeeded without the foundation that Peel had created 
in 1834 and Stanley had revived in 1852. Disraeli’s Conservativism was to function as an 
ideology for both the rich and the poor.  Much like Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism Disraeli’s 
one-nation Conservativism was meant to fully change the Tories into Conservatives.  The legacy 
of Peel’s Conservativism that survived the Corn Law crisis laid the crucial foundation upon 
which the mid-Victorian generation built its politics.  It was through this second application of 
Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism by Stanley starting in 1852, and strengthened later by Disraeli, 
that the Conservative party was brought back from its schism in 1846.  It remains an important 
facet that is often  overlooked, that Peel’s role in setting up the Conservative party may have 
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personally ended in 1846, but his ideas laid the foundation on which Stanley and Disraeli were 
able to expand upon Peel’s original Conservative message.  
*** 
The legacy of Tamworth Conservativism as this thesis demonstrated continued beyond 
Peel and did not end with Conservative division in 1846 or the death of Peel in 1850.  The 
developmental process of Tamworth Conservativism that began in the ’liberal’ Tory era was 
both a product of the times and of Robert Peel.  The central tenets of Peel’s Tamworth 
Conservativism were to accept previous reforms, preserve important institutions, pursue further 
needed reforms, both civil and ecclesiastical, and to refuse to accept unnecessary reforms that 
were perceived to be so radical that they threatened to undermine the very nature of British 
society.  These fundamental principles of Peel’s Tamworth Conservavtism became incredibly 
influential and despite their detractors were the new type of politics for the nineteenth century.   
Peel’s legacy, as Norman Gash has stated, was one of great importance for the formation 
of modern British politics and the transformation of Britain into a democracy.  The legacy of 
Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism however, was not so much a pragmatic centrist outlook as 
Gash had suggested.
358
  Peel’s politics have been reevaluated and in light of this work it can be 
concluded that Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism demonstrated an adherence to a consistent form 
of politics dating back to the Liverpool era.  An assessment of Peel’s early political career 
illustrates that his acceptance of Catholic emancipation only occurred after nearly a decade of his 
opposition to such a reform.
359
  According to Gash, his change of heart was part of his pragmatic 
centrist ideology. However, his anti-reformist stance on Catholic emancipation and the later 
Reform Bill makes this claim problematic.  His rationalization behind this change of heart over 
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Catholic emancipation and the expansion of the franchise was to maintain the stability of the 
state. In his memoirs, Peel argued that Catholic emancipation and the Repeal of the Corn Laws 
were the most difficult but necessary reforms that he ever had to support.
360
 Therefore it may be 
difficult to position Peel as a great reformer through an investigation of only his early career.  
However, Gash may be correct in his argument that Peel, after 1832, sought to pursue reform as 
a pragmatic way to conserve the state.  Peel’s pragmatism, however, was not the sole ideology 
behind his Tamworth Conservativism. As Hilton argued, Peel’s politics were more than a 
reaction to the necessary changes that the nation required.  
Boyd Hilton’s 1979 reevaluation of Peel’s politics argues that the centrist approach to 
Peel by Gash had ignored the era in which Peel’s politics took root.  A thorough examination of 
Peel’s entire political career illustrates that Peel was not a pragmatic centrist whose politics 
changed to support reforms, but rather that he had always been a follower of a certain type of 
‘liberalism’ dating back to the Liverpool government.  Peel, in Hilton’s revision, remained a 
rigid doctrinaire who was committed to free trade as far back as the 1820s.
361
  Hilton argued that 
while Peel rightfully remains the father of the Conservative party he was also the progenitor of 
Gladstonian Liberalism.  This argument can be verified in the continuation of many of Peel’s 
ideas by the Peelites, especially Gladstone and Aberdeen, after Peel’s death in 1850.
362
  
However, this evaluation of Peelite Conservativism only focuses on the direct heirs of Peel’s 
politics.  As Angus Hawking in his work on Lord Stanley suggests, a re-adoption of Peelite 
Conservativism by the Protectionists, starting with the name change in 1852, indicates that Peel’s 
                                                          
360
 Peel. Memoirs by the Right Honourable Sir Robert Peel, 2. 
 
361
 Hilton, ‘Peel: A Reappraisal’, 589. 
 
362




Conservativism was applied to the Conservative party a second time.  However, Hawking does 
not pursue this argument fully, suggesting that the Protectionists revisited the politics of Peel 
after the slow death of protectionism.
363
 Therefore, unlike the arguments made by previous 
historians, as this work has argued, Peel held a certain set of values that guided him throughout 
his entire career.   
As this thesis has argued, these values, different from mainstream Tory values, had their 
roots in the ‘liberal’ Tory era of Lord Liverpool as Hilton argued. However, unlike Hilton, this 
work has shown that Peel’s politics were not a simple continuation of ‘liberal’ Toryism, but 
rather a hybridization of Pittie Tory values and Whiggish liberalism.  This hybridization was the 
fundamental element of Peel’s Tamworth Conservativism.  Expressed explicitly in his Tamworth 
Manifesto the ideas such as necessity of reform for any and all state institutions, the 
representation of the people (both enfranchised and those who were not), and the pursuit of 
reforms were all guiding themes that were consistent throughout Peel’s political career.  These 
themes have been mistaken by Gash as centrist pragmatism and by Hilton as the continuation of 
‘liberal’ Torysism. While Peel’s contemporary critics argued that he had betrayed Conservative 
values multiple times Peel himself argued that he had advocated dramatic measures out of their 
necessity to maintain the security of the state.
364
 Peel’s statement in his memoirs arguably 
supports this claim that he was consistent with his political beliefs and that charges of apostasy 
were without warrant.  
He designed his new party to appeal to an audience beyond the old electorate and to 
create a constructive ministry.  Peel’s Conservatives would, through these means, turn the defeat 
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of 1832 into a series of successive victories leading up to a Conservative (Tory) triumph in 1841. 
Peel’s electoral victory in 1841was followed by a successful ministry built on necessary reforms 
to the institutions of the state. Amendments to the Corn Laws, the passage of the Factory Act and 
reforms to the Church were supported by a majority of his party and were successful examples of 
his Tamworth Conservativism in action.  However, his decision to repeal the Corn Laws in late 
1845 broke his party in half. Peel’s personal beliefs over protectionism and the Corn Laws have 
been a long debated and heavily politicized topic. Gash and other historians have argued that 
Peel came to be enlightened by free trade principles in 1845, while others have claimed Peel had 
converted to free trade as early as 1820 (Hilton). Regardless of his own position on free trade, in 
1820, 1841, 1846, or 1850, the important ideas behind his Conservativism during the Corn Law 
crisis manifested themselves as a reform to preserve the peace and security of the nation, a 
political principle that had remained consistent his entire life. His consistencies, rather than 
individual pragmatic decisions, are what shaped the modern political discourse in Britain. 
As this thesis demonstrates, a reevaluation of Peel’s politics cannot undervalue his 
political achievements and the changes his Tamworth Conservativism initiated. Peel’s 1834 Tory 
revival had returned the party from its disaster of 1832. 
365
  Peel’s early political career in the 
Liverpool government and his acceptance of Catholic emancipation in 1829 set his own form of 
Conservativism in place: one that was built around the need to pursue necessary reforms for the 
security of the state. Peel’s influence across the political system helped to convince the political 
elites (both Whigs and Conservatives) to become responsive to the growing demands of the 
working classes, through changes to factory labor legislation and eventually repeal of the Corn 
Laws.  His idea of Conservativism was often critiqued for its lack of principles or a definitive 
ideology. Members of Peel’s party often questioned where the line was to be drawn when it 
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came to the reform of state institutions. The Corn Law crisis of 1846 was the watershed moment 
in Peel’s political career that challenged his Conservativism.  The decision to repeal the Corn 
Laws cost Peel his political career and the unity of his new Conservative party.  However, the 
Conservative split fueled by Peel’s decision to repeal the Corn Laws was not the end of Peel’s 
Tamworth Conservativism.  The Protectionist faction lead by Stanley, Disraeli and Bentinck 
begin to revive the Conservative party after the Corn Law crisis and looked back to Peel’s 
Tamworth Conservativism for guidance. The changes that Peel helped to initiate set about a new 
political discourse in Britain that would be built upon the necessity of reform.   
Peel’s politics whether ‘Liberal’ or ‘Conservative’ left a substantial mark on the political 
discourse of modern Britain.  The making of the Conservative party through Peel’s Tamworth 
Conservativism as this thesis has shown was an active process of transforming the old Tory party 
into a new Conservative one.  As Disraeli later suggested the greatest strength of Peel’s 
Conservative party was its ability to rally under any disadvantage.
366
 Peel had attempted to 
redesign the Tories for a modern age far too rapidly and without taking into account the diversity 
of opinions within his Conservative coalition.  That task of reforming the Conservative ideology 
would fall on Lord Stanley who, after the Corn Law crisis would look back to Peel’s earlier form 
of Conservativism and apply it a second time, bringing about the complete transformation of the 
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